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Abstract
The global crisis of 2007-2008 is the most severe crisis since the Great Depression in the
financial markets. Starting with the subprime defaults in the United States, it quickly spills
over into other markets leading to the collapses of many financial institutions, bail-outs of
banks worldwide and downturns in asset prices. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the
repercussions of this crisis on CDS and interbank market and provide empirical evidence on
the changes in the pricing of CDS contracts and interbank deposits.
Chapter 2 discusses the determinants of CDS spread changes on European contracts. The
most remarkable finding of the study is that the relation between credit spreads and their de-
terminants is regime dependant and depends on the sector of economic activity. Before the
crisis the underlying credit risk in the overall CDS market is sufficient to explain credit risk.
During the crisis investors have a differing view on the risk of financial and non-financial con-
tracts. Interestingly, non-financial CDS contracts reflect the credit risk of the counterparty,
but financial contracts do not. This implies that governments are expected to bail out dealers
to prevent systemic risk.
Chapter 3 provides further insight into the European corporate CDS spreads and proposes
an equilibrium model accommodating the occurrence of structural breaks in the long-run re-
lationship between the variables. These breaks are endogenously determined within unit root
specifications used to describe the dynamics of the explanatory factors. The findings highlight
that crisis shocks are persistent and have the potential to change long-run equilibrium dynamics.
The systematic credit risk factor is proxied by the European iTraxx index and the idiosyncratic
factor by the stock price of reference entity. The model indicates that stock market leads price
discovery process. Vector error correction model confirms the strong predictive ability of the
iTraxx index and the error correcting vector for changes in the CDS spreads.
viii
Chapter 4 focuses on European interbank market and has two main contributions. First,
it estimates the cross-sectional density of interbank funding rates using nonparametric kernel
methods. Second, it analyzes the effect of banks size, the operating currency and banks’
nationality on the cross-sectional distribution of these rates. The findings strongly support
the statistical significance of these effects and highlight the importance of these factors as early
warning indicators of financial distress. Prior to the crisis, the borrowing segment of the market
exhibits distinctive features such as highly volatile and multimodal distributions suggesting the
occurrence of distortions in the cross-section of funding rates. During crisis, large domestic
banks operating in Euros enjoy the most favourable rates. Banks’ nationality analysis further
confirms that interbank market provided early warning signals of incoming sovereign crisis.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Financial markets experienced one of the most severe crises around the world in
2007 and 2008. Although the crisis started with the bursting of the United States
housing bubble, it quickly spilled over into other markets and assets resulting in the
collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments
and downturns in stock markets. This triggered a downturn in economic activity
yielding 2008-2012 global recessions and contributing to the European sovereign
debt crisis.
During this period, credit markets experienced significant disruptions posing a
threat to the stability of the financial system. Counterparty risk seemed to play a
greater role behind this disruption in both CDS and interbank market. In the CDS
market, CDS spreads evolved dramatically reflecting the increase in default risk of
the reference entities. Also, CDS contracts on the same reference entity but written
by different dealers were started to be sold from different prices showing the concern
about default risk of the seller. In the interbank market, transactions were almost
frozen, even in short term maturities. The main reasons behind this was the increase
in the default risk of the other party in the transactions, named as counterparty risk,
and the increase in liquidity risk. Hence, the turmoil highlighted the importance
1
of counterparty risk in credit markets although this had been neglected since the
beginning of the crisis.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the repercussions of the 2007-2008 crisis
on CDS and interbank market and provide empirical evidence on the changes in the
pricing of CDS contracts and interbank deposits before, during and after the crisis.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to present the reader with background
information about the relevant topics of the thesis. The chapter starts by briefly
describing the worldwide financial crisis in 2007-2008 considering the underlying
causes of the crisis and transmission of subprime crisis to other markets. The chapter
then concentrates on the characteristics of two credit markets: Credit Default Swap
and interbank market. The chapter mainly explains how the crisis affects these
markets and new regulations after the crisis. The chapter also highlights the main
contributions of this thesis to the existing CDS and interbank market literature.
Finally, the structure of the thesis is presented.
1.1 The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis
The financial market turmoil in 2007 and 2008 has been the most severe crisis since
the Great Depression and led to economic downturn throughout the world. There
are three main groups of factors that have driven the recent crisis: macro factors,
financial factors and banking misapplications. Monetary expansion in the U.S. mar-
ket, thus lower interest rates, U.S housing boom, over-generous lending and high
indebtedness of U.S. households are considered as the main macro factors of the
recent crisis. The development of new structured financial products (CDSs, CDOs,
asset-backed commercial papers), the increase in the number of hedge funds, the
emergence of structured investment vehicles and inadequate credit risk assessment
tools and regulation towards financial products and companies are considered as the
2
main triggering financial factors of the crisis (Orlowski, 2008). Two main misappli-
cations of the banking sector also contributed to this crisis. First, “Originate and
Distribute” model which is basically repacking the loans and transferring the risk
to other investors rather than keeping the loans on banks’ balance sheets. Second,
financing loans with short-term instruments which leads to maturity mismatch and
funding liquidity risk (Brunnermeier, 2009).
All these prevalent factors first triggered subprime mortgage defaults in February
2007 with a huge decline in mortgage credit default swap index (ABX). In June
2007, two hedge funds of Bear Sterns with vast exposures to subprime mortgage
asset backed securities were exposed to large margin calls. High leverage of financial
institutions accompanied by fall in house prices led to both a credit bubble and asset
price booms.
Soon after, vulnerabilities in the subprime mortgage market spilled over into
other types of assets. The crisis hit not only mortgage companies and investment
banks but also commercial banks. Evolution in the TED spread, the difference
between the interest rates on interbank loans and on short-term U.S. government
debt, is one of the best examples that illustrates the transmission of the mortgage
crisis into other assets and global financial institutions.
Figure 1.1 below depicts the TED spread captured by the difference between 3
month Libor and the 3 month Treasury bill yield. The outbreak of the subprime
mortgage crisis on August 2007 is illustrated with the first spike in the TED spread.
The second jump in December 2007 and the third jump in March 2008 shows the
spillover of mortgage crisis into financial industry. In 2008, the elevated market
and credit risk turned into liquidity and counterparty risk. Particularly, after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, concern about counterparty risk
increased further and institutions faced serious liquidity problems. As soon as in-
3
Figure 1.1: TED Spread, the interest rate between the LIBOR and the Treasury bill
rate
vestors realized huge losses on credit derivatives and stock indices, they switched
their investments from credit derivative and stock markets to commodities, espe-
cially crude oil futures market, triggering commodity price bubble. In the next
stage of the crisis, the elevated counterparty risk and liquidity squeeze in the bank-
ing industry led to credit market freeze and concurrently flight-to-safety by investors
(Orlowski, 2008). During all these stages, financial institutions that had high ex-
posure to subprime mortgages hoarded for cash, sold their assets immediately to
reduce their leverage ratio and were reluctant to lend to other institutions as they
were incapable of estimating their own liquidity needs as well as evaluating the
default risk of the counterparties.
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1.2 Credit Default Swap Market
1.2.1 The Characteristics of Credit Default Swaps
Credit derivatives are bilateral agreements whose payoff depends on the performance
of the underlying instrument. The main attraction of the agreement is that it isolates
credit risk from the underlying instrument and shares the risk between two parties
of the agreement. Main types of credit derivatives are Credit Default Swaps, Credit
Options and Total Return Swaps, being Credit Default Swaps the most popular one
with 96.7% market share.
Credit Default Swap is an over the counter contract between the seller and the
buyer of protection against default risk of debt obligations issued by a specified
reference entity. The reference entity can be a private or publicly traded firm, a
sovereign government or governmental agency. The protection buyer pays a periodic
premium over the life of the contract and in turn hedges itself against the credit risk
of the reference asset. In case of the credit event, the seller is obliged to compensate
the buyer for the loss according to the specified settlement procedure. In the mean
time, the buyer is also exposed to counterparty risk in respect of the seller of the
contract, if the seller does not have the ability to meet the obligations in case of the
credit event.
According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) defini-
tion 2003, there are six credit event types included in credit derivative agreements.
These are bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay,
repudiation/moratorium, and restructuring with four specifications: full restructur-
ing, modified restructuring, modified modified restructuring and no restructuring.
The relevant credit event type is included in the contract depending on the market
structure and reference entities’ jurisdiction and characterization.
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The price of the credit default swap, named as spread, is expressed in basis
points, which is the percentage of the notional amount of the contract to be paid
annually. In most of the CDS contracts, CDS premium is paid quarterly on certain
reference days (March, June, September and December 20th). Spread is computed
by equating the present value of premium payments to the present value of expected
losses and higher spread is the indicator of higher credit risk of the reference entity.
In case of a credit event, the CDS contract is settled in two ways. Accord-
ing to the physical settlement, the buyer delivers the reference obligation to the
seller in exchange for the par value of the bond or instrument. According to cash
settlement, CDS seller pays the difference between par value and market value of de-
faulted debt of the reference name. In March 2009, ISDA published the ISDA Credit
Derivatives Determinations Committee and Auction Supplement to the 2003 ISDA
Credit Derivatives Definitions. This supplement introduced auction settlement as
an alternative to physical or cash settlement. According to this settlement type, a
Committee, serving as a settlement auction coordinator, determine whether there
has been a credit event; whether an auction will be held; or whether a particular
obligation is deliverable or not.
Although the risk profile of CDS resembles to a corporate bond on the reference
entity, CDS contracts have many advantages over bonds. First, CDS allows taking
leveraged position as there is no need for an initial funding. Second, even if the
bond of the reference entity is not available with a specific maturity; Credit Default
Swap allows to take a position on that specific maturity. Finally, while shorting a
bond is usually difficult in fixed income markets, via buying a CDS contract, one
can easily create a short position on the reference credit.
CDS contracts are mainly categorized into three groups: Single Name CDS,
CDS Indices and basket CDS. Single Name CDS is written on the default risk of
6
the single entity. CDS Indices compose a pool of very liquid, single name CDS
contracts. Each entity in the index has equal share of the notional amount. In case
of the credit event, the CDS indices proceed to be traded with the reduced notional
amount. Unlike a CDS, which is an over the counter credit derivative, a CDS index
is a completely standardized credit security and may therefore be more liquid and
trade at a smaller bid-offer spread. CDX, iTraxx, LCDX, LevX, ABX, CMBX,
MCDS and SovX are the main CDS indices traded in the market. Basket CDSs
are written on CDS portfolios which can include from 3 to 100 reference entities.
Nth to Default Basket is the popular type of basket CDSs. Under this contract, the
seller compensates the buyer in case of the credit event of the Nth reference entity
only and the CDS contract terminates after the compensation. Single name CDS
contracts and index CDSs account for almost 60% and 30% of the overall market
respectively in terms of gross notional amount at the end of 2011.
Figure 1.2: Credit Default Swaps-Notional Amount Outstanding Semiannually
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As depicted in Figure 1.2 above, the CDS market experienced tremendous growth
and increased to $ 62.173 billion at the end of 2007, even though the size of the
market was only $ 631 billion at the end of 2001. However the impressive growth
was impeded in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the financial crisis accentuated with
the failure of Lehman Brothers. In recent years, the size of the market diminished
to approximately $ 30.000 billion according to ISDA Market Survey data. Besides
the effect of financial crisis, new standardization rules of the CDS contracts such
as introduction of operational improvements, trade compression and offsetting of
reverse positions have been influential on the fall of market size of the CDS market.
CDS contracts are mainly used for hedging and trading purposes. They are
bought to hedge credit risk of the bonds or asset-backed securities. Commercial
banks and other lenders are natural buyers of CDS protection for such purposes,
while highly rated dealers, insurance companies, financial guarantors and credit
derivative product companies are the typical protection sellers prior to the financial
crisis. CDS products are also used to hedge counterparty exposure as a risk man-
agement tool and highly popular during stressful market conditions. Moreover CDS
contracts are traded for speculative and arbitrage purposes in a way that speculators
buy CDS contracts if they expect spreads to widen and sell contracts if they expect
spreads to narrow. At the same time, CDS contract is used as a tool by the sellers
to generate income via premium payments.
1.2.2 The Contribution of CDS Market to 2007-2008 Finan-
cial Crisis
Credit Default Swaps should help for the efficiency of financial markets by improving
the allocation of the capital. When investors buy bonds, they are exposed to credit
risk while funding companies. However via Credit Default Swaps, investors who sell
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CDS written on the default risk of the bonds are subject to this risk. Hence, with
the development of CDSs, the credit risk is transmitted from bond holders to CDS
sellers who can best bear this risk (Stulz, 2010). Nevertheless during the recent
crisis, CDSs were not able to contribute to the efficiency of financial markets as
expected. The huge fall in ABX indices that composes CDS contracts written on
subprime mortgages is considered as the outbreak of the recent subprime crisis.
There are many underlying reasons that explain the contribution of CDS to the
recent crisis. First, due to built-in leverage of CDS contracts, investors are inclined
to take riskier positions with CDSs than they can bear. However, the sellers of CDS
contracts can not bear this risk during vulnerable financial times as well as during
normal market conditions. AIG is one of the best examples for this. During the
recent crisis, some of the hedging benefit of the contracts sold by AIG were appeared
to be illusory (Stulz, 2010). Second, there was a very high concentration in the CDS
market. According to data from US Treasury, at the end of 2008 five commercial
banks (JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs and HSBC)
accounted for practically 99% of the buyers and sellers of CDS in that country.
Meanwhile, according to data from DTCC, in April 2009 the five largest sellers of
CDS worldwide accounted for 49% of the total supply of these instruments, and
the ten largest sellers accounted for 72% of the supply (ECB, 2009). The collapse
of Lehman Brothers is a clear example for revealing the interconnected nature of
participants in the CDS market that results in large trade replacement costs. This
high concentration is one of the triggering factors for the increase in systemic risk
during the crisis. Hence, the precondition in the CDS market is very vulnerable for
a financial crisis.
Fourth, the opacity of over-the-counter markets played a critical role in the fi-
nancial crisis. OTC markets carry a counterparty risk externality, although this
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externality is absent when trading takes place in a centralized clearing mechanism
that provides transparency of trade positions or a centralized counterparty that ob-
serves all trades and sets prices (Acharya and Bisin, 2010). Before the crisis, almost
all of the CDS contracts were traded in over-the-counter markets and investors were
exposed to counterparty risk. However until the onset of the subprime mortgage cri-
sis, market participants perceived counterparty risk to be negligible. At this time,
default risk of the seller of the contracts had not been considered in the pricing of
CDS contracts. The importance of counterparty risk emerged during the 2007-2008
financial crisis when the bail-outs or collapses of many systemically important fi-
nancial institutions took place. In the CDS market, the best proxy for showing the
concern about counterparty risk is the CDS spreads of major dealers, CDS sellers,
in the market. The Figure 1.3 below presents the spread of four major dealers from
the beginning of 2006 to 2012.
Figure 1.3: CDS Spreads of Main Counterparties over Time
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As depicted in Figure 1.3 above, CDS spreads started increasing in the second
half of 2007 and 2008. During this time, major CDS dealers incurred substan-
tial losses on financial contracts linked to subprime mortgages. Particularly after
September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, concern about counterparty
risk surged even further. Uncollateralized transactions in which counterparties were
involved triggerred this concern more. During this period, protection buyers were
subject to terminated contracts before maturity due to the failure of sellers. Also,
CDS contracts written by CDS dealers that had low credibility were started to be
priced by lower spreads compared to those that were sold by highly credible dealers.
For instance, the case of Lehman Brothers and AIG raised the awareness of CDS
buyers about the credit risk of these sellers. Prior to the collapses, CDS contracts
written by these dealers had been sold by lower spreads.
In principle, requiring collateral and guarantees or opening opposite positions
on the existing ones are the most efficient ways of mitigating counterparty risk.
However according to the ISDA Margin Survey (2008, 2009), by the end of 2008
only 66% of transactions were protected with collateral and by the end of 2009 this
was even less; only 56% of transactions were collateralized. Even more, collateral
agreements were employed much less frequently when the counterparty was a large
dealer (Giglio, 2011). This is what we experienced during the recent crisis. The
requirements of collateral increased during the turmoil, however this did not help
to solve the problem of counterparty risk. Due to rating downgrades, some of the
dealers like AIG and Bear Sterns were required to increase the margin calls and raise
more collateral for CDS transactions, but raising capital during stressful market
conditions were difficult to accomplish for distressed parties.
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1.2.3 New Regulations in the CDS Market as a Response
to 2007-2008 Crisis
Both CDS market participants and regulators have taken some nonstandard mea-
sures after 2007-2008 crisis. CDS market participants responded to the crisis by
shifting their trading patterns. Some of them invested in contracts written on the
default risk of the counterparty, in addition to the existing contracts. Although this
can eliminate the losses in the event of counterparty default, it increases the total
cost of buying CDS protection. Also it is obvious that switching from one coun-
terparty to other one is not an effective solution if there is systemic concern about
robustness of the counterparties in the market. Further, investors prefer shorter ma-
turities. Even though the contracts with five year maturities are the most popular
ones before the crisis, investors’ preference moves from five year contracts to the
contracts with less than one year maturities in order to alleviate the concern about
counterparty risk (Vause, 2010).
From the regulators perspective, the most important changes in the CDS market
to mitigate counterparty risk is the standardization of the contracts, trade compres-
sion and the introduction of central counterparties (CCPs). In the CDS market,
standardization varies according to the type of product. While CDS indices and
index tranches were highly standardized contracts, single name CDS contracts were
less standardized till the outbreak of the crisis. New regulations introduced by ISDA
in April 2009 in the CDS market standardize single name CDS up to a level of other
CDS products such as CDS indices and index tranches. This standardization brings
convenience not only for tearing up offsetting contracts but also for trade compres-
sion.
The most important development in the CDS market is the introduction of cen-
tral counterparties (CCPs). CCPs stand between over-the-counter derivatives’ coun-
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terparties; insulating them from each others default. Instead of bilateral CDS con-
tracts between a protection buyer and a seller, a contract between the protection
buyer and a CCP and another contract between the same CCP and the protection
seller are agreed via CCPs. The main goal of CCPs is to require strict collateral from
counterparties and form an emergency fund to use in case of counterparty defaults.
Although regulators are very hopeful about the benefit of CCPs, Duffie and Zhu
(2011) investigate the efficiency of central clearing houses in reducing counterparty
exposures and collateral demand. Contrary to expectations, their findings demon-
strate that clearing only one types of derivative reduces netting efficiency. Only if
many derivatives are cleared in the same clearing houses, efficiency increases and
counterparty risk can be mitigated.
The last regulation in the CDS market is aiming to increase the transparency of
the market. CDS market is highly criticized as having been not transparent during
the crisis which is one of the drawbacks of over-the-counter markets. To improve
transparency, as well as the establishment of clearing houses, The Depository Trust
& Clearing Corporation has started providing regulators with an access to its registry
of credit default swaps since November 2008.
1.2.4 Contribution of this Thesis to the Existing CDS Mar-
ket Literature
Chapter 2 examines the determinants of CDS spread changes on European contracts
before and after the recent crisis by taking into account systematic and idiosyncratic
variables with a special emphasis on the potential effect of counterparty risk on the
contracts. Different from previous contributions, the crisis period is distinguished
from non-crisis period with a structural break test on CDS spread changes rather
than considering the same date for all contracts. The analysis reveals that the
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relation between credit spreads and their determinants in the short-term are regime
dependent and relies on the sector of economic activity. Empirical findings indicate
different pricing models for financial and nonfinancial firms. Non-financial firms are
more sensitive to systematic variables during the tranquil period, but idiosyncratic
variables during the financial crisis. However for financial firms, both systematic
and idiosyncratic variables are only informative before the crisis.
As mentioned earlier, during the past several years, counterparty risk has emerged
as one of the most important factors driving the financial markets and contribut-
ing to the global credit crisis. Despite the prominent role of counterparty risk in
recent crisis, there is hardly any attempt that examines the effect of counterparty
risk on CDS prices empirically except Arora et al. (2012). This study analyzes the
contracts sold by HSBC bank to investigate the effect of default risk of HSBC on
CDS contracts. It is observed that counterparty risk is reflected in the CDS prices
with the outbreak of the crisis. Hence, bankruptcy or bail-out of some major dealers
during crisis triggers a differentiation in CDS prices depending on the creditworthy
of the sellers. The most surprising result is that whereas the default correlation is
high between reference entity and protection seller, counterparty risk is not priced
in the financial sector. This reveals that large dealers can be allowed to fail when
non-financial firms are defaulting. However when the overall financial sector is in
distress, the market expects the government to intervene to alleviate credit risk of
the counterparty and fears of systemic risk.
Chapter 3 analyzes the long-run dynamics of a sample of CDS contracts in terms
of systematic and idiosyncratic factors. The choice of systematic factor as iTraxx
index is motivated by capital asset pricing models that consider the equity market
portfolio as the only driver of the variation on excess stock returns. The choice
of stock price as an idiosyncratic variable is motivated by the literature on credit
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risk price discovery. Different from previous contributions, the effect of the crisis
is contemplated by incorporating the occurrence of endogenous structural breaks
to the pricing of CDS contracts. These breaks are incorporated into the long run
equilibrium model making allowance for different long run dynamics depending on
the dates of occurrence of the different outlying observations. It is observed that
crisis shocks are persistent and have the potential to change long-run equilibrium
dynamics. With this respect, introducing a break to account for financial crisis
is an important addition to price discovery literature. In contrast to most of the
related literature, cointegrated threshold model indicates that CDS market is not
contributing price discovery. The leading variables are iTraxx index and firm’s stock
price.
In terms of methodology, as well as introducing structural break tests to ac-
count for financial crisis, this thesis corrects an important technical oversight in
this literature that considers standard ordinary least squares (OLS) dynamic regres-
sions to describe CDS spreads in levels, see for example Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002),
Benkert (2004), or Ericsson et al. (2009). Many previous contributions analyzing
CDS spreads do not apply any statistical test to check the stationarity of the series.
They either take the first difference to work on stationary dataset or apply standard
OLS regression on CDS spread levels, nonstationary variables, without considering
that the estimations can be biased and unreliable. In this thesis, conducting a unit
root test, CDS spreads are analyzed in changes in Chapter 2 and in levels with a
co-integration framework in Chapter 3.
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1.3 Interbank Credit Market
1.3.1 European Interbank Market
In Europe, the institutional environment of money market consists of four main ele-
ments. The central bank decides on the monetary policy and performs the strategy
of this policy. Monetary policy instruments such as open market operations, stand-
ing facilities and reserve requirement are carried out as an operational framework
for the implementation of the monetary policy and management of liquidity. For liq-
uidity needs and hedging purposes, different financial instruments such as deposits,
repos and derivatives are traded in organised exchange or over-the-counter markets.
Lastly, large value payment and securities settlement systems, clearing and netting
facilities assure the smooth functioning of payments and settlements.
The main function of the Euro-interbank market is to allow participant banks to
effectively reallocate deposit imbalances among themselves. They allow liquidity to
be readily transferred from banks with a surplus to banks with a deficit. Interbank
market rates are key part of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and they
are crucial for implementing interest rate monetary policy targets by central banks.
The variations in interbank rates are rapidly transmitted to the entire term struc-
ture, affecting borrowing conditions of households and firms and pricing of many
important derivative contracts.
For the gross liquidity need; banks prefer ECB liquidity facilities, however for
daily liquidity need; banks trade in the interbank market. In Europe, interbank
market transactions are organized in different ways: physically on the floor, by tele-
phone calls or on electronic platforms. The vast majority of transactions in Europe
take place on over-the-counter market without a specific trading regulation through
telephone. Besides over-the-counter market, an electronic market for liquidity is also
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developed in Italy called ’e-MID’.
e-MID is the only electronic platform for interbank deposits in the Euro area and
in the U.S. This screen based electronic market is under the supervision of Bank
of Italy. The platform has 246 members from 29 countries before the crisis. The
platform is fully transparent and buy and sell proposals appear on the platform
with the identity of the banks posting them. In this market, each trader can choose
any counterparty to start the trade. The two parties can negotiate the terms and
conditions of the specific trade, change the quantity/price or refuse the transaction
at all. e-MID, the supplier of the dataset of Chapter 4, represents the only readily
available source of micro data on interbank transactions in the Euro area as either
majority of the transactions are conducted over the counter or the Euro OverNight
Index Average (EONIA) rate disseminated by European Banking Federation has
daily frequency and its averaging mechanism does not allow cross-sectional or market
micro structure analysis.
1.3.2 The Effects of 2007-2008 Crisis on European Inter-
bank Market
Until August 2007, euro area money markets were functioning smoothly with stable
interest rates. The market was characterized by low interest rates, volatility and risk
premiums and was highly liquid. However 2007-2008 crisis had serious repercussions
for the European interbank market like other global financial markets.
Figure 1.4 below presents the transmission of subprime crisis to the interbank
market, depicting the spread between Euribor and Euro OverNight Index Average
(EONIA) swap rate in three months time, a standard indicator of relative stress in
the interbank market. EONIA is an effective overnight interest rate computed as
a weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions in the euro area
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Figure 1.4: European Interbank Market
interbank market initiated by the contributing panel banks. This plot also depicts
the amounts of liquidity deposited at ECB through deposit facilities. Until August
2007, the start of the subprime mortgage crisis, spread was very low with insignif-
icant amount of money parked at ECB. The main reason was that during normal
market conditions, banks preferred to lend out their money in the interbank market
as the rate offered by ECB was smaller than the rate available in the interbank mar-
ket. Until the end of September 2008, the market was characterized by very high
spread, but still there was no demand for ECB deposit facilities. However at the
end of September 2008, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, spread increased to
unexpected levels with huge amounts of money parked at ECB. As there was evap-
oration of trust in the financial markets due to the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
banks preferred parking their money at ECB despite the smaller rates rather than
lending out in the interbank market. Especially after September 2008, asymmetric
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information about counterparty risk accompanied by increase in liquidity risk im-
paired the functioning of interbank market despite an unprecedented increase in the
liquidity provision by central banks.
1.3.3 New Measures as a Response to 2007-2008 Crisis
During the turmoil period in order to sustain the smooth functioning of the system,
ECB took some nonstandard measures. It decreased the interest rate and provided
extra ordinary amount of liquidity directly to the market via long and short term
operations. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, ECB introduced fixed-rate full
allotment policy in all refinancing operations for the different maturities. This en-
abled counterparties to satisfy all their liquidity needs against adequate collateral.
The maturities of longer-term refinancing operations were increased up to one year.
The types of collaterals were expanded. The increase in types of collateral eased
banks liquidity constraints and encouraged them to extend new credit or continue
rolling over maturing loans. Moreover the Euro system started providing liquidity
in foreign currencies and purchasing euro-dominated covered bonds.
1.3.4 Contribution of this Thesis to the Existing Interbank
Market Literature
Chapter 4 examines e-MID interbank market by estimating cross-sectional density
of funding rates using non-parametric kernel methods. More specifically, this study
utilizes the cross-sectional distributions of borrowing and lending rates over time
with the aim of identifying disturbances in this market. These disturbances serve
for early warning indicators of financial distress and systemic risk. Previous papers
focus on the first moment of the funding rate to explain the characteristics of the
interbank market. In addition to this, this chapter develops analytical techniques
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to capture disturbances on the second moment of the funding rates (volatility) as
well.
In both borrowing and lending segments, leverage and feedback effects are ob-
served between cross-sectional volatility of rates and their magnitude. Leverage
effect implies that increases in the volatility of spreads are responded by increases in
funding rates over the next periods. Hence, volatility is a useful indicator of distress
in money markets. Similarly, feedback effect implies that large funding rates lead
to increases in dispersion of rates.
Dynamic analysis of the spreads reveals the different effects of 2007 and 2008
crisis on interbank markets. The first crisis has widespread effect on the entire
banking sector, leading to higher borrowing costs across the sector. However the
second crisis triggered by the collapse of some major financial institutions produces
huge level of uncertainty in whole banking sector and increases the borrowing cost
of a small sample of troubled banks compared to rest of them that obtain borrowing
spreads below the cross-sectional average.
Chapter 4 also analyzes the effect of several factors such as banks size, the
operating currency and banks’ nationality on the cross-sectional distribution of these
rates. The findings strongly support the statistical significance of these effects and
highlight the importance of these factors as early warning indicators of financial
distress. In particular being large in terms of asset size and operating in Euros is an
advantage in this market to get better rates. Also, banks based in Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain obtain liquidity with higher costs than other banks. Hence, this
market provides early warning signals of the incoming sovereign crisis well before
the actual date of the crisis.
Novelty of this chapter arises from both the methodology used and the factors
considered. In terms of methodology, the most important contribution of Chapter
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4 is to propose nonparametric kernel estimation methods for modeling the cross-
sectional distribution of rates. This methodology is novel in this field and contrasts
to most of the related literature that explains the determinants of funding rates, see
Gabrieli (2011a, 2011b), Cocco et al. (2009), Angelini et al. (2011) and Afonso et al.
(2011) using parametric panel data regression models. The advantage of this method
is that it lets the data speak by themselves. This chapter also contributes to the
literature by introducing two new factors that have influence on the determination of
spreads: Euro/NonEuro or Crisis/NonCrisis classifications. These factors enable to
examine whether being based in countries operating in Euro currency or experiencing
sovereign crisis brings a benefit for banks in the interbank market.
One of the distinctive contributions of this chapter is the database analyzed. e-
MID has many advantages over other alternatives. First, as highlighted by Beaupain
and Durre (2011), this electronic platform is a reliable source of data that allows
inferring the dynamics of the whole over-the-counter transactions. Second, it tracks
closely their better known counterparts as banks usually arbitrage with e-MID and
over the counter. Last, interest rates reflect actual transactions so that they do
not suffer from potential distortions affecting offered rates such as Libor/Euribor as
documented by Mollenkamp and Whitehouse (2008), Gyntelberg and Wooldridge
(2008) and Snider and Youle (2010). The drawbacks of these alternative interbank
rates mark the importance of the e-MID market as a reliable source of informa-
tion about the whole overnight segment of the European interbank market in an
international context.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This introductory chapter gives background information about the relevant topics of
the thesis and marks the importance of this thesis to the existing literature. Chapter
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2 investigates the short-run determinants of Credit Default Swap spreads written
on European contracts before and after the recent crisis. Chapter 3 examines the
long-run determinants of CDS spreads proposing a threshold cointegrated model
and discusses price discovery literature. Chapter 4 focuses on European interbank
market with the aim of detecting early warning indicators of distress in the financial
sector. The last chapter presents the main conclusions of this study as well as some
suggestions for future research.
1.5 Conclusion
This introductory chapter familiarizes the reader with the background information
about the topics covered in this thesis. In particular, a brief information about 2007-
2008 financial crisis and the characteristics of Credit Default Swaps and European
interbank market are outlined. As well as the contribution of the CDS market to
the recent crisis is discussed and new regulations in the CDS market are introduced.
The effect of crisis on European interbank market is presented. Contributions of
this thesis to the existing CDS and interbank market literature are highlighted.
22
Chapter 2
The Determinants of Credit Default Swap Spreads in the
Presence of Counterparty Risk and Structural Breaks
Abstract
By investigating the determinants of CDS spreads on European contracts before and
after the recent crisis, we observe significant differences in the explanatory power of
systematic and idiosyncratic variables. Before the crisis the underlying credit risk in
the overall CDS market is sufficient to explain credit risk. During the crisis investors
have a differing view on the risk of financial and non-financial contracts; whereas
non-financial CDS contracts reflect the credit risk of the counterparty, financial con-
tracts do not. Our results suggest that in case of default of financial firms, investors
expect the government to intervene to alleviate credit risk of the counterparty and
fears of systemic risk.
23
2.1 Introduction
Bond markets have been traditionally regarded as appropriate indicators to evaluate
the creditworthiness of a borrower. The risk underlying these bonds is observed in
the spread between the risky and risk free bond yields. Empirical models motivated
from structural form equations describing fixed income prices have been used to
explain variation on bond spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Avramov et
al. (2007) are within this group of articles. These authors use in particular, the risk
free rate, volatility and leverage.
The illiquidity of bond markets and the choice of appropriate measures to proxy
the risk free bond rate make the bond spread not very suitable to analyze credit risk
at high (monthly, daily) frequencies. Recently, the interest has shifted to studying
credit risk indirectly by looking at derivative markets, in particular Credit Default
Swap (CDS) contracts.
The study of CDS spreads for gauging credit risk can be theoretically and em-
pirically motivated. As documented by Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu (2006), CDS
and bond spreads converge to each other in the long run but exhibit important
deviations from their long-run equilibrium in the short run. These differences are
due to the higher liquidity of the CDS market that is able to reflect changes in
market conditions faster than bond spreads. Also, in contrast to bond prices CDS
contracts are standardized products designed to reflect credit risk of the reference
entity. Bond prices, on the other hand, differ depending on the characteristics of
the bond, the structure of coupon payments or the maturity of the debt.
Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) is one of the first studies that concentrates on CDS
spreads to explain credit risk. These authors, following the structural model ap-
proach as in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), use market variables as well as credit
ratings and explain 82% of variation in CDS spreads. The choice of explanatory
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variables for the analysis of credit risk from CDS spreads is also an important issue
highly debated in the empirical literature. Thus, Benkert (2004) describes CDS
spreads by mainly concentrating on volatility measures. This author observes that
the effect of option-implied volatility is higher on CDS spreads compared to the
effect of historical volatility, that is, forward-looking measures of risk have a higher
impact on CDS prices than historical measures. Further to Benkert (2004), Cao
et al. (2010) conclude that the relation between option-implied volatility and CDS
market is especially stronger when CDS spreads are more volatile, the rating of the
reference entity is low and options are more liquid. Zhang et al. (2009) mainly
investigate the relationship between equity return and CDS market and specifically
explore the effect of stochastic volatility and jumps on CDS spreads. By calculating
historical volatility from equity return data and the contribution of the jump using
high frequency data, their results imply that volatility risk can alone explain 50%
of CDS spread variation, while jump risk can predict 19% of the variation.
Greatrex (2009) sheds important doubts on the conclusions derived from the
analysis of CDS spreads in levels obtained in other articles, the reason being the
existence of spurious regression analyses that invalidate any statistical inference;
Greatrex (2009) proposes instead the analysis of changes on CDS spreads. By gen-
erating a rating based index based on CDS spreads and a structural form model
incorporating market variables, this author explains 35% of variation in CDS spread
changes. Ericsson et al. (2009) also analyze CDS spreads in levels and changes using
structural form variables. These authors explain 23% of variation in CDS spread
changes and up to 70% of variation in CDS spread levels.
Hardly any attempt has been made to assess the determinants of bank credit
spreads. This is probably due to opaque nature of the financial industry where
traditional credit risk models are likely to be less successful. Main exceptions are
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Dullmann and Sosinska (2007), Raunig and Scheicher (2009) and Annaert et al.
(2010). Dullmann and Sosinska (2007) explore the usefulness of CDS prices as
market indicators of bank risk based on a very limited set of variables: abnormal
stock returns, market index returns, the swap spread and the bid ask spread with a
sample that consists of three German banks. Raunig and Scheicher (2009) compare
the risk premia embedded in CDS spreads for banks and corporations. They find
that banks are perceived as less risky than corporations before the sub-prime related
turmoil began in the summer of 2007. During the turmoil period, the two groups
are priced broadly similar. Annaert et al. (2010) analyze Euro area bank CDS
spreads before and after the start of the financial crisis with variables suggested
by structural credit risk models, liquidity in the CDS market as well as variables
proxying for general economic conditions. They demonstrate that the determinants
of bank CDS spreads vary across time with a remarkable difference before and after
the start of the crisis. They also uncover sensitivity of CDS spreads on variables
suggested by structural credit risk models after the start of the crisis.
Recently, there is an interest on non-linear models to investigate the relation
between CDS spreads and its determinants. Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Gi-
ammarino and Barrieu (2009) concentrate on CDS portfolio. Alexander and Kaeck
(2008) advance a Markov Switching Model to capture the changes in iTraxx Eu-
rope indices with regime switches. They find a completely different model for fi-
nancial and nonfinancial indices. For financials, the explanatory power of their
regression models is low and almost entirely due to adding the lagged credit spread.
Giammarino and Barrieu (2009) estimate nonlinear dynamic relationship between
iTraxx index and its hypothetical components with an adaptive nonparametric mod-
elling approach. Their results indicate that systematic factors play a prominent role
during market crises. However they exhibit less intense time-dependent behaviour
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during normal market conditions. Even more, during market crises, the empirical
relation between variables and iTraxx index is contrary to expectations. Pires et al.
(2010) ) concentrate on individual CDS spreads and estimate the determinants of
CDS spreads with quantile regressions. They find a strong relation between CDS
spreads and implied volatility, put skew and absolute bid-ask spreads. Quantile ap-
proach indicates heterogeneity in the response of low-risk versus high-risk firms in a
way that both the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the goodness-of-fit
of the model increase with the quantile of CDS premiums.
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008 counterparty risk has become more ap-
parent due to the collapse of the main counterparties such as Bear Sterns, Lehman
Brothers and the bailouts of many other financial institutions. During crisis, CDS
contracts have been observed to amplify and spread uncertainty in the financial sec-
tor by reducing investors confidence and also leading to financial contagion due to
interconnectedness of the main counterparties. Hence, understanding the dynamics
of credit spreads on these markets is now more important than ever as this financial
derivative has played a critical role in the unfolding of the financial crisis. Despite
the significance of counterparty credit risk in the financial markets and its role in
the recent financial crisis, there are mainly only theoretical papers that investigate
the role of counterparty risk and default correlation between counterparties in CDS
pricing. The analysis of this risk (counterparty risk) gains importance when the
seller cannot fulfill its obligations under the occurrence of default of the reference
entity and the default correlation is high between protection seller and buyer. Some
of the theoretical studies incorporating the effect of counterparty risk and default
correlation when pricing CDS contracts are Jarrow and Yu (2001), Hull and White
(2001), Yu (2007), Huge and Lando (1999), Leung and Kwok (2005), Brigo and
Chourdakis (2008) and Lipton and Sepp (2009). To the best of our knowledge, the
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only empirical work on analyzing this effect on CDS spreads is Arora et al. (2012).
Arora et al. (2012) analyze the effect of counterparty risk on the CDS contracts
using contemporaneous CDS transaction prices and quotations provided by fourteen
large CDS dealers for selling protection on the same set of underlying reference firms.
They use the spread of CDS written on the default risk of the protection seller as
a proxy for counterparty risk and analyze the effect of default risk of the seller in a
panel regression framework. They conclude that whereas counterparty risk is priced
prior to the Lehman bankruptcy, the pricing of counterparty credit risk becomes
much more significant and is adopted by many more CDS dealers after the Lehman
bankruptcy. Interestingly, they cannot find any evidence that counterparty risk
is priced in the contracts written on the default risk of financial reference entities
although default correlation is high between reference entity and protection seller in
the financial sector.
The aim of this chapter is to find the drivers of credit risk by analyzing Credit
Default Swap spreads priced by HSBC Bank from April 2005 to November 2010.
Hence, the sample of this chapter involves data from both early stages of the CDS
market and the recent financial crisis period. This enables to investigate the effect
of potential breaks in the dataset and see how the recent financial turmoil has
changed the way that credit risk is priced in the CDS market. To do this, an
extensive and rigorous empirical analysis is carried out on the explanatory power of
idiosyncratic and systematic variables. In contrast to most of the existing literature,
this study also incorporates the existence of counterparty risk as an explanatory
variable. Unfortunately there is no opportunity to have access to CDS contracts
priced by different counterparties, therefore, this chapter can be regarded as a case
study specific to CDS contracts priced by HSBC Bank, however the results of this
study can be generalized to other main counterparties.
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This chapter also corrects an important technical oversight in this literature that
considers standard ordinary least squares (OLS) dynamic regressions to describe
CDS spreads in levels, see for example Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002), Benkert (2004),
or Ericsson et al. (2009). These authors report the coefficient of determination (R2)
to gauge goodness of fit measures for dynamic regression models in levels. All these
authors claim to explain over 90% of variation in CDS spread level. This chapter
sheds some doubts on the conclusions obtained from these analyses based on R2
goodness of fit measures. This is so because statistical analyses on the persistence
of CDS spreads in levels tend to fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root, see
for example the seminal study of Pedrosa and Roll (1998). Hence, CDS spreads
in levels are usually modeled as a unit root process and as such, these processes
have a variance that increases to infinity invalidating, in general, statistical analyses
and conclusions based on the R2. Further, the nonstationary character of CDS
spreads implies that extra care is needed to be taken when describing the relationship
between the variables explaining CDS series. Thus, to avoid spurious regressions,
CDS spreads are analyzed in changes in this chapter and the presence of a break is
also considered to acccount for a possible regime shift in the regressions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the dataset
is presented with the potential explanatory variables and their expected relationship
with CDS spreads. In Section 2.3, the econometric methodology is explained and
the findings related to CDS spread analysis are reported. Section 2.4 concludes. An
appendix collects tables and figures.
2.2 The Determinants of CDS Spreads
This section introduces the dataset used for the empirical analysis; it describes the
determinants of CDS spreads and discusses the expected relationship between these
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variables.
2.2.1 CDS Data
In this study, monthly mid quotes of CDS spreads are obtained from Bloomberg
which is one of the leading financial data providers. In particular the contracts with
the following specifications are considered: senior debt, EURO currency, quarterly
premium payment and five year maturity. The contracts with five year maturity are
chosen specifically as it is by far the most commonly traded tenor which leads to the
most liquid contracts. CDS spreads are taken as end of month values and there is
no missing value for any contract for the time period considered. The dataset in this
chapter covers the period from April 2005 to November 2010. This period has been
selected for two reasons: First, CDS market is more mature compared to the begin-
ning of the twenty first century, and second, after experiencing tremendous growth
the market started to shrink in 2008 due to the global financial crisis. This sample
period is therefore ideal to investigate the existence and effect of structural breaks
in individual contracts and estimate potential different models for both volatile and
tranquil periods.
In this study, large capitalization companies that are representative of the cor-
responding sectors of economic activity in Europe are analyzed. The name of the
firms and their corresponding industry information are listed in Table 2.1.
As one of the main aims of this study is to investigate the effect of counterparty
risk on CDS spreads, specifically CDS contracts sold by HSBC Bank PLC are used.
HSBC Bank PLC is one of the major counterparties in the CDS Market. The data
sample is obtained from Bloomberg HSBC page which displays CDS quotations on
contracts that are priced and sold by HSBC Bank.
Financial firms, especially banks, differ in a number of characteristics from other
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Table 2.1: List of Reference Entities in the Dataset
Reference Entity Sector Group
Bayer AG Pharmaceuticals Non-Financial
BMW AG Automotive Non-Financial
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC Tobacco Non-Financial
Philips Electronics N.V. Technology Non-Financial
Tesco PLC Retail Non-Financial
Total S.A. Energy Non-Financial
Vinci PLC Construction Non-Financial
Vodafone Group PLC Telecommunications Non-Financial
Allianz AG Financials-Insurance Financial
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A Financials-Insurance Financial
Aviva PLC Financials-Insurance Financial
BNP Paribas Financials-Bank Financial
Deutsche Bank AG Financials-Bank Financial
Societe Generale Financials-Bank Financial
Standard Chartered PLC Financials-Bank Financial
industrial firms. The structure and composition of their balance sheet, the opacity
of their assets, the role of central banks in their emergency liquidity needs, their
unique capital structure and different regulation rules towards them can necessitate
different pricing models for financial firms. Considering this, the findings of the
analysis are reported in two groups: Financial and Non-financial firms.
To illustrate the dynamics of CDS contracts from April 2005 to November 2010,
Figure 2.1 above reports CDS spreads on four firms representative of the main
European economic sectors: BMW, Aviva, Deutsch Bank and Vodafone. All CDS
spreads began to rise sharply due to the signals of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in
the second half of 2007. At the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 they made peaks
when many collapses and bailouts in financial markets took place. At the end of
2010, CDS spreads were much lower than at their peak values but still vulnerable
to financial shocks.
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Figure 2.1: CDS Spreads of Reference Entities over Time
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Financial and Non-Financial CDS Spreads
CDS Spread Level (bps) CDS Spread Change (bps)
Mean St.Dev. Range Mean St.Dev. Range
Non-Financial 68 64 7-435 1 26 -160-205
Financial 66 67 6-460 2 30 -145-252
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for the CDS spreads and the corresponding
series in differences for the two groups. Interestingly, the average CDS spread and the
corresponding dispersion measures (standard deviation and range) are very similar
across groups and series. The statistics for the differenced series reveal a higher
positive skewness for financial than for non-financial firms.
Table 2.4 breaks down descriptive statistics by reference entity. When analyzed
by firm, the cross-sectional variation in CDS spreads over the period studied is vast.
The minimum spread recorded is only 6 bp (e.g. financial firms), whereas maximum
spread runs up to 435 bp (BMW). Average spread ranges between 34 bp (Munich
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Re) and 115 bp (Imperial). The variations over time are also huge for especially
some reference entities like Imperial (97 bp) and BMW (95 bp). Spread changes
on average ranges between 0 and 2 bp. Minumum spread change is -160 bp and
maximum spread change increases up to 205 bp. These statistics reveal the variety
in the sample.
2.2.2 Explanatory Variables and Expected Relationship
Credit Default Swaps are usually priced using two different approaches. For reduced
form models, default is the outcome of a random jump process and is regarded as
an unpredictable event. For structural form models, the asset value of a company
is assumed to be consisting of equity and a zero coupon bond; default occurs if the
value of the firms’ asset is less than the promised debt payment at the maturity of
the debt. Risk free rate, leverage and volatility of the asset are the main empir-
ically tested determinants of structural form models. However, as documented in
many papers, their explanatory power is empirically weak. It is certain that the
structural model needs adding more explanatory variables that reflect the features
of CDS contracts and of general market conditions. In particular, two sets of vari-
ables are considered in this study classified as systematic and idiosyncratic variables
including counterparty risk. As systematic variables, the risk free rate, STOXX,
iTraxx Europe and VSTOXX indices are considered. These variables are motivated
as follows.
The structural approach predicts a negative relationship between the interest
rate and credit spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) note that a higher interest
rate should increase the risk-neutral drift of the value process which reduces the
probability of default and decreases spreads. In this study, one year Euro swap rate
is used as a proxy for interest rate. Swap rates are preferred instead of government
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bond rates, as government bonds are not regarded as benchmark for the risk free rate
any more by financial markets due to illiquidity, short selling and tax considerations.
The stock market sentiment is also very relevant to this analysis. Stock market
return is one of the most relevant proxies for the overall business climate. As general
market conditions affect expected recovery rates, CDS spread will narrow when
economic activity is high and widen when economic activity is low. Avramov et
al. (2007), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Greatrex (2009) and Aunon-Nerin et al.
(2002) confirm a negative relationship between S&P 500 index and credit risk. In this
study, Stoxx Europe 600 index is used as a proxy for general market conditions, as
the study focuses on European CDS contracts. STOXX Europe 600 Index represents
large, mid and small capitalisation companies across 18 countries of the European
region.
A related measure of asset markets sentiment more relevant for this analysis of
credit risk is the CDS Market Index. Certainly, an index constructed from CDS
contracts can reflect the market condition especially in the CDS market better than
an equity market index. iTraxx Europe index is made up of 125 equally-weighted
European names selected by a dealer poll based on CDS volume traded over the
previous six months and rating criteria. The list collecting information on liquidity
is based on trading activity data from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation
(DTCC) Trade Information Warehouse. All entities must be given an investment
grade by Fitch, Moody’s or S&P, and in order to be included in the index, they
need to be rated over BBB for Fitch and S&P and Baa for Moody’s. The index
composition is updated every half-year, on March 20th and September 20th (rolling
dates), and the basket resulting from the revision is labelled as a new series of iTraxx
Europe. After the launch of a new series, the earlier series of the index continue
to exist, but market liquidity tends to be concentrated on the most recent series
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which is often referred to as on the run. This study concentrates on the index that
is constructed as a concatenation of subsequent on the run series of iTraxx Europe.
Therefore, each available series of the credit index cover the period from its launch
date to the rolling date of the next series. This construction is motivated by the
fact that the on the run series of iTraxx Europe are the most liquid and therefore
more informative. This proxy for common risk factor captures not only the effect
stemming from a deteriorating macroeconomic outlook, but also changing investors’
risk aversion. A strong positive relationship is expected between iTraxx Europe
index and CDS spread. We will also compare explanatory power of iTraxx index
with stock market index to check whether an index coming from CDS market is
more successful to explain variations in CDS spread changes than a stock market
index.
Market wide volatility is also a proxy for business climate. Higher volatility
leads higher undertainty about the economic prospects and higher credit spreads.
VSTOXX index is used to measure market wide volatility as this study focuses on
European market. VSTOXX captures the expected volatility for the Dow Jones
EuroStoxx 50 index. Considering the U.S. market, Greatrex (2009) documents a
positive relationship between VIX index and CDS spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001) conclude that an increase in VIX index raises credit spread, yet a decrease
does not have an effect on credit spreads. As the dataset contains information from
a very volatile period, a positive relationship is expected between CDS spreads and
VSTOXX index.
As idiosyncratic variables, volatility, stock price, liquidity of the contract and
credit risk of the counterparty are considered in this study. In a similar study that
investigates the effect of bond liquidity on CDS-bond basis, Nashikkar et al. (2011)
use instead leverage, tangible assets and current ratio (the ratio of current assets
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to current liabilities) as idiosyncratic variables. The idiosyncratic variables for this
study are motivated as follows.
It is an empirical fact that an increase in volatility leads to an increase in CDS
spread. The intuition for this is that since default depends on the movement of the
firm value, the latter is more likely to default if its value oscillates more. There
are mainly two types of volatility measures in the literature: historical and option-
implied volatility. Whereas option-implied volatility reflects market expectation of
future volatility, historical volatility shows how volatile the asset is in the past.
Benkert (2004) and Cao et al. (2010) analyze and compare the effect of these
two volatility measures on CDS spread and conclude that although both have a
positive relationship with CDS spreads, the effect of option-implied volatility is
stronger than historical volatility. Based on previous studies and the forward-looking
characteristics of option-implied volatility, only this volatility measure is considered
in this study.
Stock price of the firm reflects the business and financial condition of the under-
lying company. Thus, any negative news about the company is observed in stock
prices faster than in any other variable such as rating. Further, as documented in
Welch (2004), stock price is the best proxy for capturing variation in leverage. Ide-
ally, leverage should be computed as the ratio of the book value of debt divided by
the market value of equity. However, book values of debt are reported on a quarterly
basis making difficult to obtain monthly measures of leverage. Instead, a valid proxy
for leverage used in the literature is the stock return. A higher stock return leads to
smaller leverage and an improvement on the financial condition, and hence smaller
credit risk.
Another firm-specific variable is liquidity. Literature regarding the impact of this
variable on CDS spreads is contradictory. On the one hand, since it is a derivative
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contract, not an asset, it is argued that CDS spreads cannot contain a liquidity
premium. On the other hand, the occurrence of a large bid-ask spread is interpreted
as existence of illiquidity risk. In this study, to minimize the presence of illiquid-
ity effects, only five year contracts are analyzed as they represent the most liquid
segment of the market. Nevertheless, in order to accommodate any illiquidity effect
in this market, the spread between bid-ask CDS levels is considered as a proxy for
illiquidity, see also Tang and Yan (2006). The expectation is that an increase in
illiquidity will trigger an upward movement in CDS spreads.
Another very relevant factor in this analysis is counterparty risk. As experienced
during the financial crisis with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the bailout
of Bear Sterns, the sellers of CDS contracts are not default-free. Furthermore,
especially after the crisis, it is observed that different CDS contracts written on the
same reference entity have a different price that is attributed to the risk of the sellers.
Thus, if the seller of the contract has a higher credit rating compared to the other
sellers, the corresponding CDS contract will be more expensive. Arora et al. (2012)
analyze the existence of counterparty risk on CDS contracts and use CDS spreads
of each counterparty in their sample as a proxy for counterparty risk. However CDS
spread of the counterparty cannot be an indicator of pure counterparty risk as it also
reflects general market conditions. Considering this fact, different from Arora et al.
(2012), in this study the change in the iTraxx index is subtracted from the change
in CDS spread of the counterparty (HSBC Bank in this case) and this premium
variable is used as a proxy for counterparty risk as below:
CountRiskt = ∆CDS
HSBC
t −∆iT raxxt
This allows to measure pure default risk of the seller clearing away overall credit
risk in the market proxied by iTraxx index. Negative relationship is expected be-
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tween the proxy for counterparty risk and CDS spreads, that is, when credit risk of
the counterparty deteriorates, investors are not willing to pay a higher premium for
the contracts offered by the counterparty.
2.3 Methodology and Empirical Results
In this study, monthly frequency is preferred since some CDS spreads do not change
on a daily basis and can have extreme values on some days. From a technical
point of view, daily data are exposed to autocorrelation problems which can lead to
unreliable empirical results using standard econometric methods.
The analysis will start with an overview of CDS spreads and the potential de-
terminants. Figure 2.2 exhibits time series plots of monthly CDS spreads of two
contracts versus explanatory variables. Two contracts are selected as representa-
tives of the data sample. One contract from the non-financial group is BMW, and
the other one from the financial group is Deutsche Bank. Figure 2.2 in the Ap-
pendix plots monthly CDS spreads in levels against iTraxx, VSTOXX and STOXX
indices, respectively. Until the beginning of 2008, during the tranquil period, the
plots make apparent the positive relationship between CDS spreads and iTraxx and
VSTOXX indices and the negative relationship between CDS spreads and STOXX
index. However, after 2008 due to the effects of the financial crisis, CDS spreads
generally move independently from aggregate market sentiment. Figure 2.2 also
plots the relationship between CDS spreads and the risk free rate. Until April 2007,
in line with the theory, CDS spreads move inversely to the risk free rate. Figure
2.2 lastly exhibits the plot of CDS spread levels versus implied volatility and stock
price, respectively. As expected, a positive relationship between implied volatility
and CDS spread and a negative relationship between stock price and CDS spreads
are observed.
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Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002), Blanco et al. (2005), Benkert (2004) and other related
papers use panel data analysis to study the relation between CDS spreads and the
set of explanatory variables. These panel data models assume that all the contracts
in the data sample have the same relationship with the explanatory variables. For
example, these models expect that every CDS contract has the same relationship
with the variable gauging counterparty risk. For this reason, the results from panel
data analysis can be misleading. Similarly, papers such as Greatrex (2009), Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) and Ericsson et al. (2009) run the regressions for each contract
separately, and report the average of coefficients which can also lead to invalid
inferences if the actual relation between variables varies with the CDS contract.
Instead, in this study a sample of sixteen CDS contracts are selected and eight of
them are classified under financial, and other eight of them are classified under the
non-financial group. The empirical analysis is carried out for each firm individually
allowing in turn to compare the common effects due to the group (financial versus
non-financial) and idiosyncratic effects due to the company/sector. To do this, the
marginal effects of each set of variables and the variability of the estimates within
the group are compared. For the non-financial group the individual analysis of
each firm, and in particular the study of the within variability of the parameter
estimates, allow to analyze common group effects but not to distinguish between
firm effects and the wide economic sector that each company represents. A more
detailed analysis would consider different contracts within each sector. For sake
of presentation and discussion of empirical findings only one firm for each non-
financial sector is selected and the wider analysis is left for future research. Finally,
in contrast to the studies implemented in the literature using panel data techniques
this method is less prone to show bias in the model parameter estimates although
it is less efficient since there are fewer observations from each individual time series
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than if the data are pooled. The method also permits to detect idiosyncratic breaks
to each time series. Next section will elaborate structural break tests used in this
study.
2.3.1 Structural Break Tests
Figure 2.1 reveal that all individual CDS contracts depict a tranquil and a volatile
period highlighting the existence of structural breaks in the dataset resulting from
subprime crisis or the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Ignoring these breaks can lead
to invalid inferences about the relation between variables as parameters may change
dramatically due to important economic events in empirical applications. Previous
papers such as Annaert et al. (2010) and Cesare and Guazzarotti (2010) assume
the fixed data for each contract as structural break in their dataset. The choice
of the same break date for every contract in their study can be misleading, as the
idiosyncratic properties of each contract are different. Considering this, in this study
the break dates are detected with structural break tests to differentiate the tranquil
and volatile periods. The following part of this section will illustrate structural
break tests used in this chapter on a standard linear regression model.
Structural break tests consider the standard linear regression below and check
whether the regression coefficient, βt, remains constant or not over time.
yt = x
T
t βt + ut (t = 1, ..., n), (2.1)
where at time t, yt is the observation of the dependant variable, xt = (1, xt2, ..., xtk)
T
is a kx1 vector of observations of the independent variables, with the first component
usually equal to unity, ut are iid (0, σ
2), and βt is the kx1 vector of regression
coefficients, which may vary over time. Tests on structural change are concerned
with testing the null hypothesis of ”no structural change”
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H0 : βt = β0 (t = 1, ..., n) (2.2)
against the alternative that at least one coefficient varies over time. If there are
m breakpoints, the coefficients shift from one stable regression relationship to a
different one. Thus, there are m+1 segments in which the regression coefficients are
constant and the model (2.1) can be written as:
yt = x
T
t βj + ut (t = tj−1 + 1, ..., tj, j = 1, ...,m+ 1), (2.3)
where j is the segment index, Im,n = (t1, ..., tm) denotes the set of breakpoints and
by convention t0 = 0 and tm+1 = n.
βˆ(t,j) is the ordinary least square (OLS) estimate of regression coefficients based
on the oberservations t + 1, ..., t + j, and βˆ(t) = βˆ(0,t) is the OLS estimate based
on all observations up to t. Hence βˆ(n) is the common OLS estimate in the linear
regression model. Similarly X(t) is the regressor matrix based on all observations up
to t. The OLS residuals are denoted as uˆt = yt − xTt βˆ(n) with the variance estimate
σˆ2 = 1
n−k
∑n
t=1 uˆ
2
t .
Under this setting, there are mainly two classes of tests to detect structural
changes: Tests based on F statistics and tests from generalized fluctuation test
framework.
F type of test statistics are based on Chow (1960) test where the potential
change point is known. Chow (1960) proposes to fit two seperate regressions for the
subsamples discriminated by the exogeneous break point and reject the null of no
structural break if F statistics gets too large. Chow (1960) test is formulated on the
basis of the model (2.1) as
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βi =

βA (1 ≤ i ≤ i0)
βB (i0 < i ≤ n)
where i0 is exogeneous change point in the interval (k,n-k). Chow (1960) proposes
to fit two seperate regressions for the two subsamples defined by i0 and to reject
whenever
Ft0 =
uˆT uˆ− eˆT eˆ
eˆT eˆ/(n− 2k) (2.4)
is too large, where eˆ = (uˆA, uˆB)
T are the residuals from the full model, where the
coefficients in the subsamples are estimated seperately, and uˆ are the residuals from
the restricted model where the parameters are just fitted once for all observations.
The test statistics Ft0 has an asymptotic χ
2 distribution with k degress of freedom
and Ft0/k has an exact F distribution with k and n− 2k degrees of freedom.
The natural extension of Chow test for unknown break point is to calculate F
statistics for all potential change points in an interval [t, t¯] and to reject if any of
those statistics get too large. Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994)
suggest three different test statistics to aggregate the series of F statistics into a test
statistics: supremum, average and exponential. According to these test statistics,
null hypothesis of no break is rejected when the maximal, mean or exponential of F
statistics get too large, respectively. In this study, the supremum of a family of F
statistics proposed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994) is used:
supF = supt≤t≤t¯Ft (2.5)
Generalized fluctuation tests do not assume a particular pattern of deviation
from the hypothesis of parameter constancy. To be more precise, the generalized
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fluctutation tests fit the model (2.1) to the given data and derive an empirical process
that captures the fluctuation either in residuals or in estimates.
Under the null hypothesis, the emprical process is governed by functional cen-
tral limit theorem. The boundaries for the process is determined by corresponding
limitig process with fixed probability α under the null where α is the significance
level. Under the alternative hypothesis, this process fluctuates too much and the
empirical process path crosses the boundaries (Kuan and Hornik, 1995). In this
study, OLS-CUSUM type empirical fluctation process developed by Ploberger and
Kramer (1992) is used to test for the breaks in CDS spread change. This test is
based on cumulative sums of standard OLS residuals as defined below:
W 0n(t) =
1
σˆ
√
n
nt∑
t=1
uˆt (0 ≤ t ≤ 1) (2.6)
where n is the number of observations and OLS residuals are denoted as uˆt =
yt − xTt βˆ(n) with the variance estimate σˆ2 = 1n−k
∑n
t=1 uˆ
2
t .
The limiting process for W 0n(t) is the standard Brownian bridge W
0(t) = W (t)−
tW (1) where W(.) marks standard Brownian motion. It starts in 0 at t = 0 and it
also returns to 0 for t = 1. Under the alternative, if there is just a single structural
change point t0, the path should have a peak around t0.
In this study, the deviation in the mean of CDS spread changes are tested with
OLS-CUSUM test and the supremum of a family of F test. To do this, a constant
is fitted to the model as below:
∆CDSt = αt + ut (2.7)
where ∆CDSt = CDSt − CDSt−1, t denotes time period and the break is detected
with a change in α over time. Table 2.3 presents the results of the break dates
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for each contract. Both tests indicate the same date as structural break for all
the contracts. Table 2.3 shows that for most of the firms in the study the break
occurs at the end of 2007 when the subprime mortgage crisis deepened, liquidity
diminished and some hedge funds collapsed. For BMW, Imperial Tobacco, Tesco,
Total, Allianz and Standard Chartered, the break occurred nearly 7-8 months later,
in the next wave of bankruptcies when the main dealers collapsed and fears of
systematic defaults triggered in financial markets.
Table 2.3: Structural Break Dates
Reference Entity Group Structural Break Dates
Bayer AG Non-Financial December 2007
BMW AG Non-Financial July 2008
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC Non-Financial May 2008
Philips Electronics N.V. Non-Financial December 2007
Tesco PLC Non-Financial August 2008
Total S.A. Non-Financial August 2008
Vinci PLC Non-Financial December 2007
Vodafone Group PLC Non-Financial December 2007
Allianz AG Financial August 2008
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A Financial December 2007
Aviva PLC Financial December 2007
Munich Re Financial December 2007
BNP Paribas Financial December 2007
Deutsche Bank AG Financial December 2007
Societe Generale Financial December 2007
Standard Chartered PLC Financial August 2008
2.3.2 Multiple Regression Results
In this section, multiple regressions are applied for both idiosyncratic and systematic
variables to observe which group of variables is more successful at explaining CDS
spread changes before and after the break. With these analyses, the aim is to find
whether the pricing of credit risk has changed due to shocks in financial markets.
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Multiple regression models considered in this study are as below:
∆CDSt = α0 + α1∆ImpV olt + α2r
StockRet
t + α3Liqt + α4CountRiskt + t (2.8)
∆CDSt = α0 + α1∆iT raxxt + α2∆V STOXXt + α3∆InterestRatet + t (2.9)
where ImpVol refers to Implied Volatility, StockRet; Stock Return, Liq; Liquidity
and CountRisk; Counterparty Risk.
iTraxx Europe and STOXX Indices are correlated. In order to avoid potential
multi-collinearity problems, only iTraxx Europe index is considered as a market
sentiment variable in the multiple regression analyses.
Multiple analyses on CDS spread changes are presented in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
According to our analysis, in the pre-crisis period, all CDS spreads are mainly dom-
inated by systematic factors. However during the crisis, the outlook completely
changes and even iTraxx Europe index loses its predictive power to explain credit
risk. This finding is contrary to some studies in the literature. These contrary
results stem from either considering different variables as systematic factors or con-
sidering different CDS products as dependant variable. For instance, according to
Alexopoulou et al. (2009), systematic risk is the main determinants of CDS spreads
after the summer of 2007. This difference results from considering different vari-
ables as systematic factors. While Alexopoulou et al. (2009) consider risk free rate,
market equity return and market equity volatility as systematic factors, we con-
sider iTraxx index as systematic variable besides interest rate and market implied
volatility. We have also different conclusion from Giammarino and Barrieu (2009).
This differences result from considering different credit risk product as a dependant
variable. Instead of considering individual CDS spreads, Giammarino and Barrieu
(2009) aim to explain the determinants of credit risk portfolio, iTraxx index. Ac-
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cording to Giammarino and Barrieu (2009), the relation between iTraxx index and
systematic factors such as interest rate, market equity return and market equity
volatility is more stronger during financial crisis. However, in our study, we inves-
tigate the relation between corporate CDS spreads and credit risk portfolio (iTraxx
index) and other macro variables.
Moreover, during the crisis, idiosyncratic variables have different effects on fi-
nancial and non-financial firms. For non-financial ones, CDS spreads become more
sensitive to idiosyncratic variables rather than to systematic factors. However, for
financial firms both systematic and idiosyncratic variables fail to explain most of
the variation in CDS spreads. Hence, the relation between credit spreads and their
determinants is regime dependent and depends on the sector of economic activity.
Further, as underlined by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) for CDS indices, there is a
need for regime switches when modelling CDS spreads and a different pricing model
is required to model financial and nonfinancial contracts.
The explanatory power of multiple models in this study is very high compared to
previous related studies using stationary regression models such as Greatrex (2009)
and Ericsson et al. (2009). Systematic variables explain up to 90% and 65% of
variation in CDS spread changes before and after the break, respectively. On the
other hand, the variables related to idosyncratic characteristics can explain the
variation in CDS spread change up to 81% and 57% before and after the break,
respectively. These results provide empirical evidence that incorporating iTraxx
index and counterparty risk into the regressions enhance the explanatory power of
empirical models for describing the variation in CDS spreads.
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2.3.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, as a robustness check, the individual relationship between CDS
spread and explanatory variables is explored. With this analysis, the relationship
between CDS spread change and its determinants before and after the break is
compared. Simple regression models considered in this study are presented below.
∆CDSt = α0 + α1∆iT raxxt + t (2.10)
∆CDSt = α0 + α1r
STOXX
t + t (2.11)
∆CDSt = α0 + α1∆V STOXXt + t (2.12)
∆CDSt = α0 + α1∆InterestRatet + t (2.13)
∆CDSt = α0 + α1∆ImpliedV olatilityt + t (2.14)
∆CDSt = α0 + α1r
StockReturn
t + t (2.15)
∆CDSt = α0 + α1Liquidityt + t (2.16)
∆CDSt = α0 + α1CounterpartyRiskt + t (2.17)
with ∆CDSt = CDSt − CDSt−1, rSTOXX and rStockReturn is the log return on
STOXX Index and Firm’s Stock Prices. Counterparty risk is defined as CountRiskt =
∆CDSHSBCt − ∆iT raxxt. As explained in Section 2.2.2, CDSHSBCt measures de-
fault risk of HSBC as a protection seller and iTraxx index gauges overall credit risk
in the market. The difference between two represents pure credit risk of the seller,
namely pure counterparty risk.
This section allows to compare the explanatory power of STOXX index with
iTraxx index with the aim of revealing which market variables is more effective on
individual CDS contracts. Also, the marginal effect of the risk of the counterparty
on changes on CDS spreads is tested.
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Table 2.7 reports the results of simple regressions with systematic variables. Be-
fore the break, all CDS contracts have a positive and very strong relation with iTraxx
Europe index. Nevertheless, the influence of iTraxx Europe index on individual CDS
contracts is remarkably smaller after the break compared to the tranquil period. Be-
fore the break, adjusted R2 value ranges between 88% (Vodafone) and 40% (Munich
Re). After the break, R2 value lies between 14% (Standard Chartered) and 56%
(Tesco). This reveals that individual contracts break away from aggregate market
movements during the turmoil period. The relationship between CDS spreads and
other systematic variable, stock market index, is also similar. Before the crisis, all
contracts have a negative relationship with STOXX index, however after the break,
most of them do not have any relation with stock market index. Comparing the
predictive power of iTraxx index on CDS spreads with stock market index, a sup-
porting evidence is documented for the hypothesis stating that a CDS market factor
can better explain variation in CDS spread changes than a stock market factor. The
findings are in favor of the hypothesis not only before the crisis, but also after the
start of the crisis. Hence, CDS market index is a better systemic risk factor than
stock market index to explain individual CDS contracts. The relation between CDS
spread changes and market wide volatility index (VSTOXX) is also in line with
expectations and previous studies. During the tranquil period, all contracts have
a strong positive relationship with the volatility index. However, during the crisis,
half of them exhibit statistically significant positive relationship, while other half
break away from market volatility index. Lastly, before the crisis, most of the con-
tracts have a negative relationship with interest rate in line with the predictions of
structural credit risk models. However, with the start of the crisis, like other market
wide variables, most of CDS spreads do not have statistically significant relationship
with interest rate. Summarizing, simple regression models with systematic variables
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suggest that CDS spreads are more responsive to market wide factors during tran-
quil periods than volatile times. Moreover, the CDS market index is a better proxy
than the stock market index to proxy for general economic conditions in the pricing
of individual CDS contracts.
Table 2.8 presents the results of simple regressions with idiosyncratic variables.
Before the crisis, half of the firms exhibit a strong positive relationship with option-
implied volatility, however during crisis, it seems that most of the CDS contracts
are not related to market expectation of future volatility. Stock return variable,
that is proxying for business and financial condition of the reference entity and also
variation in leverage, exhibits stong relation with CDS contracts during the tranquil
period. After the break, as experienced with other explanatory variables, only two
of them have a negative relation. Lastly, the effect of liquidity in the CDS market is
investigated by looking at the relation between bid-ask CDS spread and CDS spread
change. During the tranquil period, in some contracts, increase in bid ask spread,
the indicator of increase in illiquidity, results in increase in CDS spreads. However
during the volatile period, liquidity has no effect on CDS contracts. To sum up,
simple regression results indicate that most of the contracts have expected relation
with CDS spread change before the break. Nevertheless, during the crisis, only few
of them have the anticipated relationship with explanatory variables.
2.3.4 Marginal Contributions of Idiosyncratic and System-
atic Variables
Marginal contributions of variables reveal the relative importance of each group
of variables on the determination of CDS spreads. With this aim, the marginal
contributions of idiosynacratic and systematic variables to the model are compared
to reveal the most effective group on the pricing of CDS spreads as suggested by
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Dullman and Sosinska (2007) and Annaert et al. (2010). First the regressions
with all systematic and idiosyncratic variables are estimated. Then the marginal
contibution is measured with this formula: mck, R
2−R2k, of the kth risk driver block
(idiosyncratic and systematic variables) to the total R2. R2k is the R
2 of the kitchen
sink regression, when the variables of the k-th block are omitted. The marginal
contribution of k-th block is calculated with the formula below:
mck =
R2 −R2k∑2
k=1(R
2 −R2k)
(2.18)
This ratio gives the relative contribution of kth block of variables to the sum
of the marginal contributions. In order to prevent negative contributions, R2 is
considered instead of adjusted R2. Table 2.9 shows marginal contribution of id-
iosyncratic and systematic variables on the determination of CDS spreads for the
subsamples; before and after the break. Before the crisis, CDS spreads are pre-
dominantly determined by systematic factors. Marginal contributions of systematic
factors range between 63% and 95% for non-financial firms and 80% and 92% for
financial firms. However idiosyncratic variables play a trivial role in the pre-crisis
period. The highest contribution of idiosyncratic variables is recorded as 37% in
Vodafone CDS contract. During the crisis, the decomposition of variables changes
significantly. Marginal contribution of systematic variables decrease for all firms
while marginal contribution of idiosyncratic variables increases considerably for all
the contracts except Vodafone and Munich Re.
2.3.5 Analysis of Counterparty Risk
Counterparty credit risk is a highly debated issue in recent years as it emerges as one
of the most important factors of the recent global credit crisis. In principle, standard
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agreements between counterparties necessitate full collateralization and specify the
details such as the nature and the type of the collateral to be provided. Hence,
the market standard of full collateralization seems to imply that there should be no
pricing of counterparty credit risk in CDS contracts. However in reality, collateral
is not always enough to cover all the loss in case of the credit event, and there is
always probability that the buyer suffers from significant credit losses. Hence, it is
not always possible to mitigate counterparty credit risk entirely.
One of the aims of this study is to investigate whether counterparty risk is
incorporated in the pricing of CDS spreads or CDS market is still only pricing
default risk of the reference entity. This is done for contracts sold by HSBC Bank.
To do this, the following simple regression model is estimated to analyze the effect
of counterparty risk on CDS spread change:
∆CDSt = α0 + α1CountRiskt + t (2.19)
The results of this analysis presented in Table 2.8 suggest that prior to the
crisis, only BMW and Imperial from the non-financial group price counterparty
default risk significantly. However after the break produced by the financial crisis,
all non-financial contracts start pricing the default risk of HSBC Bank. One possible
explanation for this result is that collateralization could have been considered as a
sufficient measure to mitigate counterparty risk for most of the contracts in the
period preceding the crisis. Also, during this period, the market assesses HSBC
Bank or many other banks as a risk-free entity since no major counterparties have
experienced bankruptcy, bail-out or default before. However, during the financial
crisis, especially with the collapse of Lehman and bail out of AIG, the market realized
that even these big dealers are not too large to fail and there exits weaknesses
with existing collateral protocols and legal protections. Hence, due to the fear of
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systematic defaults, the default risk of HSBC has started to be reflected in CDS
prices. Incorporating more explanatory variables into the analysis like model (2.8)
does not seem to lead to qualitatively different results.
The empirical analysis also suggests that counterparty risk is not priced for CDS
on financial contracts. This finding particularly poses a puzzle for the second period
under analysis. In principle, the correlation argument suggests that the counter-
party credit risk for the CDS dealers should be most evident when they are selling
protection on firms in the financial industry. Following this, the observed increase
on default correlation between reference entities and the major CDS counterparties
in this period should lead to a decrease on the corresponding spread that is not ob-
served empirically. This unexpected result is in line with Arora et al. (2012) which
obtain similar results by examining CDS contracts priced by a cross-section of large
counterparties. These authors suggest that large CDS dealers could be allowed to
fail when non-financial firms are defaulting. However when other major financial
firms begin to default, in order to prevent the chaos, the market expects large CDS
dealers, such as HSBC in this case, to be treated as too large to fail. This is illus-
trated with the bail-outs of AIG and GE Capital. A similar result is observed by
Nashikkar et al. (2011) in the analysis of liquidity effects on bond spreads; these
authors note that for financial firms there is an implicit obligation by regulators to
step in when a financial crisis unfolds in order to prevent financial contagion.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter explores the ability of idiosyncratic and systematic variables to explain
variation in credit default swap spreads in changes. Sixteen European CDS contracts
priced by HSBC bank are considered and they are grouped as financial and non-
financial firms. The sample period is from April 2005 to November 2010.
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One of the most remarkable results from this small scale study on HSBC con-
tracts is that the relation between credit spreads and their determinants is regime
dependent and depends on the sector of economic activity. Empirical findings indi-
cate that CDS spreads on financial firms behave quite differently from CDS spreads
of non-financial firms, especially during the financial crisis. For non-financial firms,
CDS spreads are mainly determined by systematic variables during the tranquil
period, but by idiosyncratic variables during the volatile period. For non-financial
firms, both idiosyncratic and systematic variables are informative in the tranquil
period but lose their explanatory power during the financial crisis. Hence, these
findings suggest different pricing models for financial and non-financial contracts.
The analysis also finds that the iTraxx Europe CDS index is the variable with
the strongest predictive ability to describe variation in CDS spreads. In fact, this
variable can alone explain most of variation in CDS contracts and hence can be
interpreted in a similar way to the market portfolio in standard capital asset pric-
ing models. However, this variable also loses its predictive power on single CDS
contracts during the financial crisis period suggesting that CDS spreads decouple
from the underlying global credit risk during this period and are mainly driven by
idiosyncratic factors.
Finally, the analysis of counterparty risk using data from HSBC Bank offers some
of the first insights in the literature on the pricing dynamics of counterparty risk in
the CDS market. The empirical analysis indicates that counterparty risk has started
to be priced in the CDS contracts on non-financial firms after the outset of the
financial crisis, that is, CDS contracts written on the same reference entity are sold
at different prices depending on the creditworthiness of the seller. Contrary to non-
financial contracts, there is not any counterparty risk effect on financial contracts.
After the financial crisis, investors expect that the implementation of regulatory
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measures and government intervention are sufficient to guarantee the fulfillment of
the credit derivative contract even under default of the counterparty with the aim of
avoiding systemic risk. Given the prominence of HSBC in the banking sector, and
in particular in the CDS market, and the similarities of this studies’ results with
Arora et al. (2012), the results of this study can be generalized to CDS contracts
issued by other major protection sellers existing in the financial marketplace.
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Appendix 2.A
Figure 2.2: Time Series Graphs of CDS Spreads and Potential Explanatory Variables
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Chapter 3
Long-Run Risk Dynamics, Instabilities and Breaks on
European Credit Markets over a Crisis Period
Abstract
This article investigates the role of the long-run determinants of European corporate
CDS spreads during the recent financial crisis. To do this we divide the determinants
of CDS spreads in systematic and idiosyncratic factors, and propose an equilibrium
model that accommodates the occurrence of structural breaks in the long-run rela-
tionship between the variables. These breaks, interpreted as outlying observations,
are endogenously determined within unit root specifications used to describe the
dynamics of the explanatory factors. We observe that crisis shocks are persistent
and have the potential to change long-run equilibrium dynamics. The systematic
credit risk factor is proxied by the European iTraxx portfolio and the idiosyncratic
factor by the stock price corresponding to each CDS contract. Exogeneity tests ap-
plied to this novel econometric specification reveal that for these contracts the credit
risk discovery process is in the factors and not in the CDS market. R2 measures
corresponding to the vector error correction representation of the equilibrium model
confirm the strong predictive ability of the iTraxx portfolio and the error correct-
ing vector for changes in the CDS spreads. Stock returns do not exhibit predictive
power though.
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3.1 Introduction
Price discovery deals with the efficient and timely incorporation of the information
implicit in different markets’ prices which are informative about the price of credit
risk. There are two main approaches used to determine the price discovery pro-
cess in asset markets: The Information Share (IS) of Hasbrouck (1995) and The
Permanent-Transitory Decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Hasbrouck
(1995) considers that the information share associated with a particular market is
defined as the proportional contribution of that market innovations to the innova-
tion in the common efficient price. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) focus on the relative
speed with which different markets incorporate new information and attribute supe-
rior price discovery to the markets that adjust least to deviations from the long-run
equilibrium. An efficient price discovery is characterized by a quick adjustment of
market prices that enables the restoration of the long-run equilibrium.
There is a growing literature on understanding information flows between credit
and equity markets. Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu (2006) observe that CDS and
bond spreads converge to each other in the long run but exhibit important deviations
from their long-run equilibrium in the short run. Thus Blanco et al. (2005) consider
a vector error correction model (VECM) for explaining changes in bond and CDS
spreads using data from a small cross-section of US and European firms and find
that price discovery takes place primarily in the CDS market. Similar results are
found in Zhu (2006) for a sample of 24 international issuers of CDS contracts. This
author notes the leading role of the CDS market in the credit risk discovery process.
The first paper to incorporate the informational content of the stock market in the
analysis of CDS prices is Longstaff et al. (2003) who use a vector autoregressive
(VAR) framework to examine the lead-lag relations between credit derivatives, cor-
porate bonds and equity markets. They conclude that information tends to flow
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first into credit derivative and equity markets, and then into the corporate bond
market. Using a similar methodology for a sample of 58 companies during 2000-
2002, Norden and Weber (2009) find that stock returns lead CDS prices and bond
spreads, and that the series of changes in CDS spreads Granger causes bond spread
changes. Forte and Pen˜a (2009) also confirm the leading role of stock markets with
respect to CDS and bonds in the credit risk price discovery process. These au-
thors using a VECM representation explore the dynamic relationship between stock
market-implied credit spreads, CDS spreads and bond spreads, and find that the
CDS market leads the bond market.
These studies are extended to incorporate the recent crisis period. Thus, for
a large set of European companies, Forte and Lovreta (2012) find that during the
period 2002-2008 the stock market informational dominance documented in the
literature arises especially in times of financial crisis. In tranquil times, the contri-
bution of CDS to the credit risk discovery process proves to be equal or higher than
that of the stock market. The increase of counterparty risk and illiquidity during
the financial crisis seems to affect the credit risk discovery process, especially the
leading role of CDS with respect to the bond market. Arce et al. (2012), in a Euro-
pean Monetary Union context, find that the recent financial crisis is characterized
by large discrepancies between CDS and bond spreads, that should vanish other-
wise in a frictionless world. These authors find that the price discovery process is
state-dependent and the leading role of CDS is negatively related to the existence
of counterparty risk and market risk proxied by VIX.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of the long-run determinants
of the spreads on major European corporate credit default swap contracts. To do
this, the determinants of CDS spreads are classified as systematic and idiosyncratic
factors; the systematic credit risk factor is the European iTraxx credit risk portfolio
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that comprises 125 CDS contracts on major European private corporations. The
idiosyncratic risk factor is the stock price of each underlying firm on which the
CDS contract is written. This choice of idiosyncratic factor also allows investigating
the credit risk discovery process between the CDS credit market and the equity
market. During crisis, iTraxx index has started to increase reflecting the overall
increase in the credit risk of the companies. Stock prices of the firm which reflect the
business and financial condition of the company have started to decrease reflecting
the deterioration in the financial condition of the firms.
In this study, the effect of the crisis is contemplated by incorporating the occur-
rence of endogenous structural breaks to the parameters. The occurrence of breaks
on the parameters such as iTraxx index and stock price of the firm is tested with
the implementation of unit root tests that allow a break suggested by Vogelsang
and Perron (1998). The null hypothesis implies that these shocks have a permanent
effect on the parameters and the alternative hypothesis corresponds to temporary
shocks fluctuating around a deterministic trend function. This test also allows dis-
criminating between additive and innovative outliers while testing the persistence of
the breaks. An additive outlier occurs instantly and is not affected by the dynamics
of the series; in contrast, an innovative outlier is transmitted more slowly to the
series of prices and exhibits more persistence than the additive outlier.
Unit root character of CDS spreads and parameters implies that appropriate
techniques for modeling the dynamic relation between variables should be based on
cointegration. Hence, a long run equilibrium is proposed to describe the dynamics
of corporate CDS spreads in terms of their idiosyncratic equity prices and the evolu-
tion of the iTraxx credit risk portfolio. The proposed econometric specification for
modeling this long-run relationship incorporates the occurrence of the endogenous
breaks to the parameters (iTraxx index and stock price) and makes allowance for
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different long-run dynamics depending on the dates of occurrence of the different
outlying observations. This long run equilibrium model also allows checking the rela-
tion between individual CDS spreads and market portfolio as well as price discovery
process between CDS spread and stock price. To model the short run dynamics of
the model, Vector Error Correction Model is also estimated. This model explains
changes in CDS spreads in terms of changes in iTraxx index, stock return of the
firm, the occurrence of breaks on these parameters and error correction term.
The validity of the results are checked in two ways. First, exogeneity of the
parameters is checked. The exogeneity of the parameters justify the validity of the
proposed model and reliability of the results. Second, Johansen (1991) maximum
likelihood methodology is applied to check the validity of the model in the multi-
variate form.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the econometric methodology, estimation methods and testing techniques. Section
3.3 describes the data and discusses the empirical application to a sample of twenty
five CDS contracts included in the European iTraxx index. Section 3.4 concludes.
Appendix 3.A collects tables.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
This section discusses the methodology implemented in the empirical application.
First unit root tests robust to the presence of additive and innovative outliers are
discussed. The null hypothesis implies that these shocks have a permanent effect
on the dynamics of the series. The alternative hypothesis corresponds to tempo-
rary shocks fluctuating around a deterministic trend function. The second block
introduces a long-run equilibrium model that implicitly considers the occurrence of
breaks to the variables and the corresponding error correction model representation.
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The last block considers a test to determine the exogeneity of the factors explaining
the CDS spreads. The null hypothesis of exogeneity validates the cointegrated tri-
angular system proposed in Philips (1991) compared to a more general cointegrated
VAR specification exploited in Johansen (1991) inter alios.
3.2.1 Unit Root Tests with Breaks
Vogelsang and Perron (1998) extend previous work by Perron (1989, 1990), Per-
ron and Vogelsang (1992), Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Banerjee et al. (1992)
amongst others, and propose a battery of unit root tests that allow a shift in trend
at an unknown time. The shift can be due to additive or innovative outliers; an
additive outlier occurs instantly and is not affected by the dynamics of the series.
An innovative outlier model is applicable to cases where it is more reasonable to
view the break as occurring more slowly over time. In this study, a model that
accommodates the occurrence of both types of outliers is proposed to test for the
statistical significance of each effect.
A convenient way to incorporate the effect of the additive outlier in the dynamics
of the series is to assume an instantaneous break with a permanent effect on the
drift of the model. The innovative outlier can take various forms. In this study, the
literature mentioned above is followed and it is assumed that the series reacts to
a break of this type in the same way that it responds to shocks to the innovation
process. Let Yt be a univariate time series with 1 ≤ t ≤ T ; under the null hypothesis,
the econometric specification that makes allowance for an additive outlier is
Yt = µ+ δDUt + βt+ Yt−1 + ψ∗(L)et (3.1)
Similarly, the unit root specification that accommodates the occurrence of an inno-
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vative outlier is
Yt = µ+ βt+ Yt−1 + ψ∗(L)(θD[Tb]t + et) (3.2)
where Tb is the break date, D(Tb) = 1(t = Tb + 1), D(Ut) = 1(t > Tb) and 1(·) is
the indicator function; ψ∗(L) = A∗(L)−1B(L) defines the moving average represen-
tation of the noise function et, where et is i.i.d. (0, σ
2) and A∗(L) and B(L) being
polynomials in L of order p and q, respectively. The roots of these polynomials are
assumed to be strictly outside the unit circle. For the model with an additive outlier,
the impact of the change in mean is δ; for the innovative outlier case the immediate
impact is θ while the long run impact is ψ∗(1)θ. Under the alternative hypothesis
of stationary fluctuations around a deterministic trend function, Yt is given by
Yt = µ+ βt+ ψ(L)(δDUt + et) (3.3)
with ψ(L) = A(L)−1B(L) with A(L) = (1− αL)A∗(L). In the stationary case, the
immediate impact of the change in mean is δ and the long run impact is δψ(1). The
testing regression equation proposed by Vogelsang and Perron (1998) is
Yt = µ+ βt+ δDUt + θD(Tb)t +
k∑
i=1
ωiD(Tb)t−i + αYt−1 +
k∑
i=1
ci∆Yt−i + et (3.4)
Under the null hypothesis of a unit root, α is equal to one. These authors propose
to estimate this regression by OLS and test for the unit root condition using the
infimum of a vector of t-statistics for the parameter α, each corresponding to a
possible break date Tb with 1 < Tb < T . The inclusion of the dummy variables
D(Tb)t−i (i = 1, . . . , k) in (3.4) is necessary to ensure that the limiting distribution
of the t-statistic on α is invariant to the correlation structure of the errors and
robust to the presence of an additive or innovative outlier. The t-statistics for the
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parameters δ and θ can determine the type of break affecting the process. The case
θ = 0 corresponds to the occurrence of an additive outlier, δ = 0 corresponds to the
innovative outlier case and θ = δ = 0 corresponds to the absence of breaks in the
dynamics of the time series. For details on the estimation procedure and asymptotic
theory, see Vogelsang and Perron (1998).
Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that Yt is a unit root process with a
structural break occurring at time T̂b. The next stage of the modeling strategy is to
propose a long run equilibrium model that explicitly considers the variations in the
dynamics of the factors due to the occurrence of outlying observations.
3.2.2 Econometric Model
Let Zt = (Yt, Xt)
′ be a 1 + k-vector of unit root processes where Yt denotes the
variable under study and {Xit}ki=1 are the factors with power to explain the long-
run dynamics of the response variable. Under the assumption that all variables are
unit roots, the VECM representation of a general VAR(p) model for Yt is
∆Zt = α0 +BZt−1 +
p∑
j=1
Φj∆Zt−j + εt (3.5)
where α0 is the intercept of the model, B = ηγ
′ is a matrix of rank r indicating the
existence of r cointegrating relationships given by the combination γ′Zt−1, where γ
is an (1 + k)× r vector and η a T × r matrix denoting the effect of the cointegrating
errors on ∆Zt. Johansen (1991) proposes a maximum likelihood method based on
computing the rank of the matrix B for estimating the number of cointegrating
relationships in Zt and the corresponding cointegrated vectors.
All the variables in this model are potentially endogenous. In many economic
models, however, certain variables can be treated as weakly exogenous for the esti-
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mation of long-run relationships among other variables. The estimation of the long-
run relationships can be conducted conditional on these variables. The assumption
that Xt is exogenous gains importance in the context of this paper motivated by
the search of the factors with power to explain the long-run dynamics of Yt. It is
shown that if a given variable is weakly exogenous for the long-run parameters (η
and γ), the cointegrating vectors of interest must not appear in the generating model
of that variable, that is, the variable must not be error correcting. Tests for weak
exogeneity are discussed later in this section. Under weak exogeneity, model (3.5)
becomes triangular, see Philips (1991), and estimation of the long-run parameters
of interest is performed by OLS. The parameter estimator vector is super-consistent
but its asymptotic distribution is nonstandard and depends on nuisance parameters
arising from serial correlation in the errors, see Park and Philips (1988).
In this section, this triangular system is extended with a new set of variables. The
relation between variables are modelled in a non-linear context where non-linearity
in the parameters is modelled with dummy variables. These dummy variables are
endogenously determined by the occurrence of the outliers estimated within the unit
root specifications discussed above. Let Wi,t = Xi,tD(Ûi,t) with D(Ûi,t) = 1(t > T̂i,b)
and i = 1, . . . , k indicating the idiosyncratic character of the break dates. The
cointegrated system modeling the long-run dynamics of Yt is
Yt = β0 + β
′
1Xt + β
′
2Wt + εt (3.6)
with Wt = (w1t, . . . , wkt)
′, β1 = (β11, . . . , β1k)′, β2 = (β21, . . . , β2k)′ and εt a station-
ary error term. Hence, this model allows modelling the non-linear relationship in a
way that the relation between variables may change due to the recent financial crisis.
The VECM representation of this model is ∆Yt = λ
′Mt+ut with Mt = (X ′t,W
′
t , εt−1)
′
and ut a zero-mean white noise process. Estimation can be carried out by OLS meth-
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ods and asymptotic inference is asymptotically normal.
This modeling strategy assumes that break dates are known and assesses their
impact on the long-run relationship between Yt and the rest of variables. The discrete
character of the indicator function defining the variables in Wt implies that there is
no estimation effect on the OLS estimates of the β parameters of using estimated
break dates instead of actual break dates as long as these estimates are statistically
consistent, see Chan (1993) for a discussion of statistical inference for threshold
models. This model is in the spirit of Quintos (1995) that proposes a rank test
for the existence of two cointegration regimes determined by a known break date.
Equation (3.6) generalizes this idea by making allowance for as many as k + 1
cointegrating vectors to describe the dynamics between the variables. Thus, the
long-run dynamics between the variables before the occurrence of T̂1,b are driven by
the vector β1, from time T̂1,b the long-run impact of X1t on Yt is β11 +β21, from time
T̂2,b the long-run dynamics of Yt due to X2t are driven by β12 +β22 and so on for the
rest of factors. An alternative strategy is to assume that break dates determining the
nonlinearities in the cointegrating relationships are unknown; Hansen and Johansen
(1993) using a rank test and Gregory and Hansen (1996) using augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) type tests propose methods designed to test the null hypothesis of no
cointegration against the alternative of cointegration in the presence of a possible
regime shift.
The omission of Wt in (3.6) yields inconsistent estimates of β1 and λ in the
regression equations for the long-run equilibrium and short-run dynamics, respec-
tively. This omission can also yield spurious feedback effects in the linear VAR(p)
representation (3.5). To show this, let ε∗t = Yt − β˜′1Xt denote the linear long-run
equilibrium relationship defined by the long-run parameters β˜1, that neglects Zt
from the cointegrated system. There is causality running from Yt to Xt if the latter
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variable is error correcting, more formally if cov(∆Xt, ε
∗
t−1) 6= 0. After some algebra,
it can be shown that
cov(∆Xt, ε
∗
t−1) = cov(∆Xt, εt−1 − (β˜1 − β1)′Xt−1 + β′2Wt−1)
Under exogeneity of Xt, this covariance is equal to cov(∆Xt, (β1 − β˜1)Xt−1) +
cov(∆Xt, β
′
2Wt−1). The first term represents the bias due to considering the wrong
cointegrating vector and the second term is due to the omission of the additional
variable Wt. Under augmented unit root specifications of Xt, see (3.2), these covari-
ance terms are different from zero.
3.2.3 Robustness Checks
3.2.3.1 Exogeneity of the Factors
The next step is to test for the weak exogeneity of Xt. Several tests can be imple-
mented to assess this condition. In this study, a Wald test is proposed to simulta-
neously check for the weak exogeneity of all the factors in the system. The testing
regression equation is
∆Xt+1 = ρ0 + ρ1ε̂t +
p∑
j=1
Φj∆Zt−j+1 + vt+1 (3.7)
where Φj is a (k+1)×(k+1) matrix and vt+1 is a Gaussian white noise error vector.
This formulation can be extended to accommodate the vector ∆Wt within ∆Zt on
the right hand side of the equation. For simplicity, the exogeneity is tested using the
linear version of the model. It is important to note that the main feature of (3.7)
is the inclusion of the error correcting variable εt−1 instead of ε∗t−1. By doing this,
the regression model considers the existence of breaks in the factors when testing
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for exogeneity of the regressors Xt.
The weak exogeneity is characterized by the joint hypothesis Ho : ρ1 = 0. This
regression equation is estimated by OLS and Ho is tested using the test statistic
DT = T ρ̂
′
1V̂ (ρ̂1)
−1ρ̂1 (3.8)
with V̂ (ρ̂1) the k× k covariance matrix estimated by OLS methods. Under the null
hypothesis, DT converges to a χ
2
k distribution. Under the alternative hypothesis,
some factors are endogenously determined within the system. If the factors are
endogeneous in the system, in this case the factors Xt are not truly determinants of
Yt, all the variables in the model are determined endogenously within the system.
The number of cointegrating vectors is likely to be larger than one to reflect other
potential long-run equilibrium relationships within the variables in the system.
3.2.3.2 Multivariate Cointegration Test-Johansen Methodology
Another method to check the validity of the model is to consider general VAR(p)
model (3.5) explained in the beginning of Section 3.2.2 and apply Johansen (1991)
estimation and testing procedures. Obtaining similar results reinforce the validity
of the model.
3.3 Empirical analysis of the CDS market
This section analyzes the drivers of CDS spreads issued on main European firms
comprised in the European iTraxx credit risk portfolio. The section discusses first
the data and second, the findings obtained from applying the models derived in the
preceding section.
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3.3.1 European CDS data
The iTraxx Europe index comprises 125 reference entities with constituents deter-
mined by a number of liquidity and ratings criteria. The list collecting information
on liquidity is based on trading activity data from the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation (DTCC) Trade Information Warehouse. This list is ranked according to
trading volumes such that the entities with the highest trading volume are included
in the index. All entities must be given an investment grade by Fitch, Moody’s or
S&P, and in order to be included in the index, they need to be rated over BBB for
Fitch and S&P and Baa for Moody’s. Entities from the EU and the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) given by Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, are
listed in this index. The final index has the following sector decomposition. There
are 30 companies on Autos & Industrials sector, 30 companies in the Consumers
sector, 20 in the Energy sector, 20 in Technology, Media & Telecommunications
(TMT) and 25 firms from the Financial sector. The index composition is updated
every half-year, on March 20th and September 20th (rolling dates), and the basket
resulting from the revision is labelled as a new series of iTraxx Europe. After the
launch of a new series, the earlier series of the index continue to exist, but market
liquidity tends to be concentrated on the most recent series which is often referred to
as on the run. This study concentrates on the index that is constructed as a concate-
nation of subsequent on the run series of iTraxx Europe. Therefore, each available
series of the credit index cover the period from its launch date to the rolling date
of the next series. This construction is motivated by the fact that the on the run
series of iTraxx Europe are the most liquid and therefore more informative.
CDS data of reference entities are collected as monthly mid quotes of CDS
spreads and are obtained from Bloomberg which is one of the leading financial
data providers. CBGN is a Bloomberg generic composite price, which provides a
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snapshot of intraday prices taken at 5:00 pm local time in each of the three regions
(New York, Tokyo, London). The Bloomberg generic intraday price is the average
of all contributor prices that have been updated during the previous 24 hours. For
the analysis in the next subsection, contracts with the following specifications are
considered: senior debt, EURO currency, quarterly premium payment and five year
maturity. The contracts with five year maturity are chosen specifically as it is by far
the most commonly traded maturity which leads to the most liquid contracts. The
dataset in this study covers the period from April 2005 to March 2012 (83 monthly
periods).
The sample for the empirical study in the following subsection considers 25 con-
tracts divided into the five sectors of economic activity represented in the iTraxx
index. The descriptive statistics for these sectors show that the average spreads are
110 (94), 49 (30), 92 (94), 74 (60) and 78 (41), with standard deviations in brackets.
The largest dispersion is found for Autos & Industrials that exhibit spreads that
vary between 15 and 710 basis points. Consumers is, on the other hand, the sector
that exhibits higher concentration of spreads. These descriptive statistics show that
CDS spreads are for all sectors of economics activity highly skewed to the right
indicating the existence of a few companies with an important contribution to the
right tail of the cross-sectional distribution of spreads.
3.3.2 Empirical findings
3.3.3 Application of the Model
The aim of this empirical study is to analyze the long-run dynamics of a sample of
CDS contracts comprised in the European iTraxx portfolio in terms of systematic
and idiosyncratic factors. These factors can be interpreted as market-specific and
firm-specific, respectively. The market-specific factor is summarized in the iTraxx
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portfolio. The choice of this variable as a proxy for the systematic factor is motivated
by capital asset pricing models that consider the equity market portfolio as the only
driver of the variation on excess stock returns. Interestingly, preliminary analysis
on the order of integration of this variable and its relation to the Stoxx 50 index and
the vStoxx index, representative of the European equity market, reveal that these
variables are pairwise cointegrated with iTraxx implying that it is sufficient to have
the latter variable in the CDS long-run regression equation. The idiosyncratic factor
is the stock price of each firm on which the CDS contract is written. The choice of
this variable for proxying the idiosyncratic factors is motivated by the literature on
credit risk price discovery above discussed.
The long-run equilibrium model of interest is based on the econometric specifi-
cation (3.6). For each CDS contract, the vector Xt is given by the iTraxx index and
the stock price, that are assumed, and later tested, to be exogenous. The variable
Wt is constructed after applying the unit root test in (3.4) that accommodates the
presence of additive and innovative outliers. Table 3.1 reports the estimates of model
(3.4) for the iTraxx index and the 25 idiosyncratic stock prices. The purpose of this
unit root test is twofold: first, it shows that the factors can be modeled as unit roots
and second, it provides consistent estimates of the break points at the same time as
it permits their classification as additive or innovative outliers. The sign of µ and δ
reveal opposite effects of the breaks on the drift of the stock prices and the iTraxx
index. The estimates and statistical significance of δ show overwhelming evidence
on the existence of an additive outlier for most firms with the only exceptions of
Vivendi and Credit Suisse. In general, the unit root specification with a drift being
negatively affected by an additive outlier is appropriate to model the dynamics of
the stock prices of the firms in our study. The statistical significance of the time
trend parameter is mixed: for Autos&Industrials and Consumers is significant but of
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small magnitude; for Financials, however, it is not statistically significant at 5% for
any company. The occurrence of the break date also deserves some attention. The
methodology proposed by Vogelsang and Perron (1998) detects a break on December
2007 for iTraxx. For most of the firms the break occurs during 2008, interestingly,
for TMT firms the breaks are detected during the fall of 2007. Philips is the only
firm reporting a break after the summer of 2008.
The unit root character of these series validates the long-run equilibrium model
proposed above. More specifically, the model under consideration is
CDSt = β0 + β
′
1Xt + β
′
2Wt + εt for j = 1, . . . , n (3.9)
with Xt = (it, st), Wt = (itD(Ûit)stD(Ûst)) where it is the European iTraxx port-
folio, st is the idiosyncratic log stock price corresponding to the underlying firm;
D(Ûit) and D(Ûst) are the variables constructed from the estimated break dates.
Table 3.2 presents the estimates corresponding to (3.9). The correct specification of
(3.9) is assessed through the two-step procedure employing ADF tests developed by
Engle and Granger (1987). The test statistic rejects the unit root null hypothesis
for all firms in the study. Unreported results using Gregory and Hansen (1996)
methodology corroborate these findings in all cases.
The contribution of the factors is as theoretically expected. The iTraxx is posi-
tively related to the CDS series and the stock price negatively related. The statistical
relevance of the stock price is weak, being only significant for Alstom, British Amer-
ican Tobacco, Repsol and Vivendi. The vector Wt reflecting the discontinuities on
the long-run effects of the factors on the spreads shows mixed evidence on the im-
portance of the stock price and iTraxx. For Autos&Industrials and Consumers the
marginal effect of the iTraxx index is much smaller than before the break, for TMT
and Financials the discontinuity produced by the break is not statistically signifi-
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cant. Interestingly, these results are reversed when analyzing the long-run effects of
the stock price after the occurrence of the different breaks. This effect is positive
for Financials, increases the spread, and negative for TMT. A possible explanation
for this contrasting results may be in the sign and magnitude of the intercepts of
the long-run equilibrium model. The Engle and Granger cointegration test shows
uncontestable statistical evidence on the rejection of the unit root hypothesis in
favor of the stationarity hypothesis. The likelihood ratio test reported in Table 3.2
compares the linear version of (3.9) against the extended version considering Wt. In
14 out of 25 cases the linearity hypothesis is rejected at 5% significance level. At
10% significance level, there are 16 firms rejecting the linear null hypothesis.
Table 3.3 reports the estimates of ∆CDSt = γ
′
1∆Xt+γ
′
2∆Wt+γ3ε̂t−1+ut, model-
ing the short-run dynamics of the deviations of the long-run equilibrium model. The
results obtained illustrate the importance of considering the long-run dynamics for
modeling the short-dynamics. The error correcting vector is statistically significant
in most cases and exhibits a negative sign in line with expectations. Interestingly,
there is a common message stemming from the individual regressions. Changes in
CDS prices can be to a large extent explained by changes in the systematic credit
risk iTraxx portfolio. In contrast, observed returns on the equity of the underlying
firms hardly have explanatory power. The intercept is not significant for any firm.
The main difference between this model and a standard capital asset pricing formu-
lation is the inclusion of the error correcting variable that contributes to explaining
much of the variation on the series of changes of CDS spreads. The variations cor-
responding to changes in Wt are significant for Energy and Financials. As for the
long-run equilibrium model, the sign of the parameters is opposed between sectors.
The returns on the stock price after the break have a positive effect on the change on
the CDS price for Allianz and Barclays; for Enel and Repsol, the effect is negative.
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These findings are reinforced by the values of the R2 goodness of fit measure that
oscillate between 46% for Enel and 81% for Allianz, providing evidence of a very
reasonable goodness of fit for most CDS contracts.
3.3.4 Robustness Checks
3.3.4.1 Exogeneity of the Factors
The validity of these empirical findings hinges on the exogeneity assumption im-
posed on the factors Xt. This condition is statistically assessed using the Wald test
(3.8) applied to the regression equation (3.7) with Zt = (CDSt, it, st)
′. Overall, the
p-values of the DT test reported in Table 3.4 confirm the exogeneity of the factors
for 19 out of the 25 firms in the study. Interestingly, the exogeneity is rejected for
four contracts in the Energy sector and two contracts in the TMT sector. These re-
sults suggest that credit risk is not exogenously determined by the factors. Instead,
there is a feedback effect between the idiosyncratic CDS spreads and the iTraxx
portfolio. These results give indirect evidence on the weight of the Energy sector in
the iTraxx credit risk portfolio. For BP, the bivariate long-run causality is between
the idiosyncratic stock price and CDS price. Leaving aside this sector, the rest of
findings are somehow surprising given the significant amount of empirical work on
price discovery noting the presence of bidirectional causality between the CDS and
stock markets. These exogeneity tests shed important doubts on this evidence and
point towards model misspecification issues derived from applying the linear coin-
tegrated version of the cointegrated model between stock prices and CDS spreads.
The first column in Table 3.4 serves to illustrate the statistical significance of the
error correcting variable implicit in the long-run econometric specification proposed
in this paper.
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3.3.4.2 Multivariate Cointegration Test-Johansen Methodology
A further robustness check to validate the correct specification of (3.9) is to ap-
ply the Johansen (1991) procedure to the general linear cointegrated VAR model
(3.5). Table 3.5 reports the trace statistics to determine the number of cointegrat-
ing relationships in the system Zt and the OLS estimates of the error correcting
variables corresponding to each variable in the system. The lags of ∆Zt in (3.5) are
not reported for sake of space. For most firms, the null hypotheses characterized
by the existence of one and two long-run equilibrium relationships, respectively, are
not rejected. The error correcting variable corresponding to the CDS series is sta-
tistically significant for Autos&Industrials, Energy and TMT, but for example not
for Financials. For a few firms, there is causality running from the CDS market to
the iTraxx and from the CDS to the stock price. Overall, the results in Table 3.5
do not massively suggest the existence of model misspecification with the exception
of a few firms. Instead, the VAR model and the Johansen procedure reinforce the
validity of the exogeneity assumption.
This empirical section has provided support to the exogeneity of the iTraxx
credit risk portfolio and the idiosyncratic stock price for modeling the long-run
determinants of credit default swap spreads. This relationship is nonlinear and
characterized by the occurrence of additive outliers affecting each factor at different
dates.
3.4 Conclusions
This article investigates the determinants of the long-run risks affecting the Eu-
ropean credit market and proxied by Credit Default Swaps on major European
corporations. These determinants are divided into systematic and idiosyncratic risk
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factors. The iTraxx credit risk portfolio summarizes the dynamics of the first group
of market-specific variables and the idiosyncratic stock price of each firm summarizes
the content in firm-specific variables.
This article uncovers that long-run risks in the European credit market are highly
nonlinear during the crisis period. This nonlinearity is modeled as a cointegrated
threshold model characterized by the occurrence of additive outliers to unit root
models for the dynamics of the factors. This econometric model can explain the
effect of unexpected shocks to the financial system that indirectly impact on the
dynamics of CDS prices through the occurrence of shifts to the long-run relationship
between the variables.
In contrast to models studying the price discovery process between the credit
market and the equity market, it is observed that the factors are weakly exoge-
nous and hence, the CDS market does not contribute to price discovery in financial
markets. The leading markets are the iTraxx credit risk portfolio and the idiosyn-
cratic firm’s stock price. The general VAR cointegrated representation of the model
and the corresponding Johansen estimation procedure give further support to this
modeling strategy.
The short-run dynamics modeling changes in the series of CDS spreads can be ex-
plained by simple versions of a capital asset pricing model based on the iTraxx credit
risk portfolio taking up the role of the equity market portfolio. The main difference
with standard formulations of the CAPM is the inclusion of the error correcting
variable measuring the departures from the long-run equilibrium relationship. In
contrast, idiosyncratic stock returns are hardly significant for explaining variations
in the first differences of CDS spreads.
The current literature demonstrates the strong relation between CDS spreads
and option implied volatilities. A possible extension of this chapter could be to
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consider option implied volatility as an idiosyncratic variable and market impled
volatility such as VIX or VSTOXX as a systematic variable. This analysis can
enhance our understanding about price discovery process between option implied
volatilities and CDS market.
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Chapter 4
Early Warning Indicators of Money Market Distress: A
Non-Parametric Approach
Abstract
One of the main interests in studying interbank money markets lies in their ability
as early warning indicators of distress in the financial sector. The contributions
of this paper are twofold: First, we investigate this money market by estimating
the cross-sectional density of interbank funding rates using nonparametric kernel
methods. Second, we analyze the effect of several factors such as banks size, the
operating currency and banks’ nationality on the cross-sectional distribution of these
rates for the European e-MID interbank market. Our results strongly support the
statistical significance of these effects and highlight the importance of these factors
as early warning indicators of financial distress. In particular we observe that prior
to the recent financial crises, the borrowing segment of the interbank market exhibits
distinctive features such as highly volatile, multimodal distributions suggesting the
occurrence of distortions in the cross-section of funding rates. During these crisis
episodes, large domestic banks operating in Euros enjoy the highest lending - lowest
borrowing spreads indicating the existence of optimal features defining successful
banks. Banks’ nationality is a particularly revealing factor in helping to uncover the
existence of a link between distress in the interbank market and sovereign risk.
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4.1 Introduction
Interbank markets are the main instrument for the transmission of monetary policy
targets from central banks to the overall economy. These markets are responsible for
distributing liquidity across the financial system by allowing the transfer of funds
from banks with a surplus to banks with a deficit. This is discussed for example
in Ho and Saunders (1985), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Freixas, Parigi and
Rochet (2000), amongst others. These authors note the insurance role of interbank
markets against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
As well as the insurance role, interbank markets can be a threat to the stability
of the financial system. The connectivity between banks offered by these markets
increases their exposures to systemic risk and serves as a channel of contagion be-
tween distressed economies (Rochet and Tirole, 1996). The shock of an insolvent
bank may propagate to other banks through interbank linkages, with the probability
of contagion affected by the topology of the network of mutual exposure (Allen and
Gale, 2000 and Freixas et al., 2000). In the empirical literature, many papers inves-
tigate the fragility of the banking system analyzing interbank market data, such as
Angelini et al. (1996), Wells (2004), Furfine (2003), Upper and Worms (2004) and
Sheldon and Maurer (1998). A recent paper by Mistrulli (2011) utilises a unique
dataset that consists of actual bilateral exposures (as opposed to aggregate multi-
lateral exposures) and concludes that the Italian interbank market is conducive to
financial contagion, however it hardly triggers systemic risk.
During the crisis, interbank interest rates underwent record levels and trading
activity in these markets saw an unprecedented decline in most market segments.
The collapse of major financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers contributed
to the loss of confidence in the health of the overall financial system and the rise in
risk aversion levels that led to the dry up of liquidity in interbank markets. This
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increase in funding rates between banks also produced the flight to quality from the
interbank money market to the European Central Bank (ECB) deposit facilities.
To overcome this malfunctioning of the interbank money market, central banks
around the world considered nonconventional measures mainly centered on injecting
liquidity into the system. The success of these measures were mixed with interest
rate spreads remaining at levels well above those observed before the financial crisis.
The network studies analyse changes in the way banks form links, and assess if,
as a consequences of these changes, the resulting network of exposures becomes more
or less resilient to random defaults, see Furfine (2003), Iori et al. (2006), Iori et al.
(2008) and Boss et al. (2006). Rather than attempting to measure systemic risk via
these stress-test type of exercises, in this chapter the evolution of the cross-sectional
distributions of credit spreads are monitored. Public or private information banks
have about each other, should be quickly incorporated in the rates lenders charge
to their borrowing counterparties. Uncertainty about the environment and the risk
exposure of specific banks should lead to more volatile rates. Cross sectional distri-
bution of spreads has the potential to quickly incorporate any worrying signal and
the evaporation of trust among banks that accompanies a crisis. The aim of this
chapter is to verify this hypothesis by looking at the dynamics of these distributions
around recent periods of financial distress. It is therefore economically meaningful
to develop analytical techniques capable of fully capturing these disturbances that
can be of various forms: high volatility periods, large funding rates reflecting wide
spreads between lending and borrowing rates and across banks in the system or
the occurrence of different clusters around focal points. These highly asymmetric
features highlight the importance of using statistical measures beyond the first mo-
ments of the funding rates distribution. The first contribution of this chapter is to
propose nonparametric kernel estimation methods for modeling the cross-sectional
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distribution of borrowing and lending rates in the European interbank market. This
novel methodology, hardly explored in this context, provides more flexibility for
accommodating the above mentioned stylized facts than standard parametric distri-
butions such as Normal or Student-t distributions. This methodology also contrasts
to most of the related literature that explains the determinants of funding rates in
interbank money markets, see Gabrieli (2011a ,2011b), Cocco et al. (2009), Angelini
et al. (2011) or Afonso et al. (2011), using parametric panel data regression models.
The second contribution is to empirically analyze the factors that can have an influ-
ence on the level and dispersion of the interbank funding rates. Besides size of the
banks, this study addresses Euro-NonEuro and Crisis-NonCrisis classifications as
the potential determinants of the variation in funding rates diffferent from previous
contributions. Euro refers to banks that are based in countries operating in Euro
currency and NonEuro represents banks that are based in countries operating on
their own currencies. Under Crisis category, banks based in countries experiencing
sovereign crisis are classified. These factors allow us to investigate whether operat-
ing in Euro currency bring a benefit for the banks or whether experiencing sovereign
crisis has a negative impact on the borrowing or lending spreads. The motivation
for doing so is the strong relationship between interbank money markets and the
overall financial system and the speed with which shocks to the money market are
reflected as disturbances to the overall economy. The correct understanding of the
effects of these factors on the interbank funding rates can help policy makers and
financial regulators to device appropriate structures for banks in order to be able to
adequately respond to their financing needs under the occurrence of shocks to the
financial system.
A distinctive contribution of this work is the database analyzed. In this chapter,
data on overnight transactions from July 2006 to August 2009 on the e-MID money
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market trading system are used. The e-MID market represents the only readily avail-
able source of micro data on interbank transactions in the Euro area and offers the
most comprehensive dataset reflecting actual transactions and not offered rates. The
overnight segment is strongly influenced by the Eurosystem’s operational framework
implying that overnight rates are less exposed to market participant’s speculative
behavior.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the
properties of the e-MID interbank market and describes the dataset. Section 4.3
describes the econometric methodology based on density kernel estimation to assess
the behavior of lenders and borrowers conditional on banks size, currency and banks’
nationality. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical findings obtained from applying these
methods to the large dataset. Lastly, Section 4.5 concludes. Tables and figures are
collected in the appendix.
4.2 The e-MID Market and Data
This section introduces the characteristics of the e-MID interbank market and the
dataset used for the empirical analysis.
4.2.1 The e-MID Market
The e-MID company, established in 1990, makes use of an electronic platform to
manage the interbank unsecured deposit market in Europe. It is the only electronic
trading platform for interbank deposits in the Euro area and in the US. Under
the supervision of Bank of Italy, credit institutions and investment companies can
participate in this market if their total net asset size is respectively at least 10
million US Dollars (or its equivalent in another currency) and 300 million euros (or
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its equivalent in another currency). Before the financial crisis, the platform had
246 members from 29 EU countries and the US, of which 30 were central banks
acting as market observers. Interbank deposit maturities range from overnight to
one year with overnight contracts representing nearly 90% of total volume. After
the crisis, the number of countries with banks actively participating in the e-MID
market is sixteen: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and
United Kingdom.
One distinctive feature of the platform is that it is fully transparent. Buy and
sell proposals appear on the platform with the identity of the bank posting them. In
the overnight market segment, a buy transaction is an interbank loan proposed by
the borrowing bank submitting a bid quote on the screen, hence revealing itself as
liquidity-short to the market; a sell transaction is an interbank loan initiated by the
lender submitting an ask quote on the screen, hence revealing itself as liquidity-long.
The platform does not offset any counterparty risk; search costs are identical for all
platform participants. In this market, each trader can choose any counterparty
present in the book to start the trade. The two parties can negotiate the terms and
conditions of the specific trade, change the quantity/price or refuse the transaction
at all. During the financial crisis a decrease is observed in the volume of transactions
and number of participants largely because of the transparency of the e-MID market
that induces banks to search for alternative, less transparent sources of funding.
Thus, before the crisis, the amount of transactions executed on the e-MID platform
accounts for 17% of total turnover in unsecured money markets in the Euro Area,
decreasing to around 10% of market share after the financial crisis.
Figure 4.1 presents monthly average of daily volume and number of transactions
over the sample period. There is clear evidence that participation in this market
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decreases during the crisis. Some of this decline can be explained by a general
decrease in the interbank transactions as banks prefer to deposit their money in
ECB rather than lending it to each other at the prevailing interest rates. The other
obvious reason is related to the transparent nature of the market. Banks, especially
borrowers, may avoid to reveal their liquidity shortage appearing on the borrowing
side. Hence they may prefer to trade in a less transparent environment during
financial shocks in order to avoid being openly seen in the market.
Table 4.1 presents average transaction size of different sized Italian banks and
foreign ones participating in the e-MID system. These statistics reveal a correlation
between transaction and institution size for domestic banks. Transaction sizes are
proportional to their asset size which is in line with the findings of Furfine (1999)
for the FED funds market. Table 4.1 also reports the market share of foreign and
different sized domestic banks with respect to the total number of transactions and
amounts traded. Foreign banks have more than 50% total volume market share in
both sides of the market. High participation of foreign banks in the e-MID market
acknowledges its international character.
4.2.2 Data
The dataset used for this study consists of all the transactions recorded in the
platform between 12 July 2006 and 8 September 2009. For each transaction, there is
comprehensive information about the date, the time of trade, quantity exchanged,
the interest rate, transaction side (buy or sell) and the code of the quoting and
ordering banks. The database contains 125 Italian and 90 foreign banks acting as
borrowers, lenders or both during the period of study. Although the identity of
the banks is not available, information on capitalization for the Italian banks and
the origin country for all banks are available. Italian banks are classified into 5
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groups according to their weighted asset portfolio: major banks (higher than 60
billion euro), large banks (from 26 to 60 billion euro), medium banks (from 9 to 26
billion euro), small banks (from 1.3 to 9 billion euro) and minor banks (less than
1.3 billion euro). Only overnight (O/N) and the overnight long (ONL) contracts are
considered in this study where ONL refers to contracts when more than one day is
present between two consecutive business days. The interest rate is expressed as an
annual rate and the amount of the transaction is quoted in millions of Euros.
It is observed that the trading activity of borrowers/lenders is affected by the
reserve maintenance period, announced by the ECB, rather than by calendar month
effects. This is so because banks need to comply with regulatory requirements on
the amount of capital held over such periods. Empirically, for the EONIA rates,
Gaspar et al. (2008) report an increase in market activity towards the last days of
the reserve maintenance period described by a remarkable increment in the num-
ber of transactions and in the underlying volatility of interest rates. To capture
these effects, monthly periods determined by the reserve maintenance period are
considered. In this dataset, there are 38 monthly periods.
The spread of each transaction is defined as the deviation of the transaction
interest rate from the daily average market rate. More formally,
sb,t = rb,t − rd,t (4.1)
with rb,t an individual interest rate outstanding for bank b at time t, and rd,t the
average rate of all transactions in the market on day t. The interest in analyzing the
spread rather than the crude interest rate is for cross-comparison purposes between
the banks trading in the interbank market. In order to reduce the noise due to
extreme movements in funding rates, aggregate daily spreads computed over the
reserve maintenance periods are considered. For a bank b executing Tb,m transactions
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on a given month m, the monthly average credit spread is calculated as below:
sb,m =
1
Tb,m
Tb,m∑
t=1
sb,t. (4.2)
This statistic is complemented with a measure of volatility that provides information
on the distribution of the variability of daily funding costs for each bank over the
monthly maintenance period. The monthly standard deviation of the daily spread
of each bank is
sdb,m =
√√√√ 1
Tb,m
Tb,m∑
t=1
(sb,t − sb,m)2 (4.3)
The number of borrowers varies from month to month between 62 and 127 and the
number of lenders between 78 and 156. The number of observations on a particular
month may be smaller than the number of banks, simply because some banks may
not be active during that period.
The methodology of this study is implemented on six subperiods to control for
the impact of important market events. Table 4.2 presents information about the
sub-periods considered in this study. January 2007, August 2007, March 2008,
September 2008 and March 2009 are considered as the dates defining the different
periods in the European interbank market. February 2007 corresponds to the crash
of the Shanghai Stock Exchange considered as one of the first signals of the financial
crisis. Therefore, July 2006 to January 2007 is considered as the “Pre-crisis Period”;
January 2007 to August 2007 as a “ Financial Markets Unease Period”. August 2007
is accepted as the date when sub-prime mortgage crisis spilled over into the interbank
market, hence, from August 07 to March 08 is considered as the “Interbank Crisis
Period”. In March 2008, Bear Sterns collapsed and its collapse was the prelude
to the increased tension in the investment banking sector. Right after, financial
markets experienced the largest bankruptcy with the collapse of Lehman Brothers
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in September 2008 triggering heightened concerns on counterparty risk and the cease
in lending activities between commercial banks. Considering these important dates,
March 08 to September 08 is classified as “Pre-Lehman Period” and September 08 to
March 09 as “Post-Lehman Period”. Lastly, the period from March 09 to September
09 is considered as the “Post-Crisis Period” when the interbank market shows the
first signals of recovery.
4.3 Econometric Methodology
This section discusses the methods necessary to perform empirical analysis. The
cross-section of interest rates and underlying volatility outstanding in the interbank
market over the recent years will be modelled in this section. To do this, in the
following, the main techniques for nonparametric kernel density estimation and the
corresponding estimation of the quantile function will be presented.
Let (x1, x2, ..., xn) be an iid sample drawn from some distribution with an un-
known density function f(·). Its nonparametric kernel density estimator is
fˆh(x) =
1
nh
n∑
i=1
K(
x− xi
h
) (4.4)
where K(·) is a kernel function and h is a bandwidth parameter. The kernel function
must be a density function, nonnegative and symmetric. The size of bandwidth
chosen for kernel density estimation determines the degree of smoothing produced.
The kernel function and bandwidth parameters accommodate a wide range of options
that provide some flexibility in the estimation of the density. For a nice review on
nonparametric kernel methods the interested reader is referred to Li and Racine
(2007).
Conditional density estimation is the realization of regression where instead of
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estimating the expected value E(Y |X) with Y the response variable and X the
regressor vector, it models the full density f(Y |X). By doing this, the method
provides valuable information about skewness, kurtosis, multi modality, extreme
values and any other statistics that require knowledge of the underlying distribution.
The following paragraphs detail the kernel method for conditional density estimation
with the appropriate kernel functions chosen for each variable, conditional quantile
functions and bandwidth selection method for the model specifications.
Let g(·, ·) and µ(·) denote the joint and marginal densities of (X, Y ) and X, re-
spectively. Y is the dependent variable which is the spread/volatility in the models
below and X as the vector of explanatory variables which in the application corre-
sponds to a vector of ordered discrete factors such as monthly time period or banks’
asset size and (unordered) discrete factors such as Euro/Non-Euro and Crisis/Non-
Crisis classifications. fˆ and µˆ denote the corresponding kernel estimators and
fˆ(y|x) = gˆ(x, y)
µˆ(x)
(4.5)
for the kernel estimator of the corresponding conditional density function. It is
immediate to observe that the conditional density estimation is the ratio of two
kernel density estimators. As Y is a univariate continuous random variable, the
kernel estimation of the joint density g(·, ·) and marginal density µ(·) are given by
gˆ(x, y) = n−1
n∑
i=1
K(x,Xi, λ)kh0(y, Yi) (4.6)
and
µˆ(x) = n−1
n∑
i=1
K(x,Xi, λ). (4.7)
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The kernel function for the continuous dependent variable Y (spread/volatility) is
kh0 (y, Yi) = h
−1
0 k((y − Yi)/h0) (4.8)
where k((y − Yi)/h0) is one of the multiple choices existing in the literature (e.g.
Gaussian, Uniform, Epanechnikov) and h0 is the smoothing bandwidth parameter
corresponding to Y .
The kernel function for discrete random variables is more convoluted than for
continuous random variables. Wang and van Ryzin (1981) type kernel function
is used below for the ordered discrete factors, monthly time period and asset size
classifications used in the posterior empirical analysis. This function takes the form:
K(xd, Xdi , λ) =

1− λ, if Xdi = xd,
(1−λ)
2
λ|X
d
i −xd|, if Xdi 6= xd
where λ is the smoothing vector for the ordered discrete factor Xd and can lie
between 0 and 1.
For the analysis focused on dichotomic conditional variables, such as Euro against
Non-Euro currencies and Crisis against Non-Crisis classifications, the following ker-
nel function developed by Aitchison and Aitken (1976) is used:
K(xd, Xdi , λ) =

1− λ, if Xdi = xd,
λ
(c−1) , if X
d
i 6= xd
where λ is the smoothing vector for the discrete factor Xd and c is the number of
(discrete) outcomes assumed by the factor; λ in this case lies between 0 and (c−1)/c.
As conditional variables have two outcomes (Euro, Non-Euro or Crisis, Non-Crisis)
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in this context, the bandwidth parameter λ lies between 0 and 0.5.
The estimation of conditional quantiles is also relevant in the analysis to deter-
mine the distribution of cross-sectional interest rates and volatility. A conditional
quantile qα(x) with 0 < α < 1, is defined as
qα(x) = inf {y ∈ Y : F (Y |X) ≥ α}. (4.9)
This is estimated by inverting the estimated conditional cumulative distribution
function corresponding to the conditional density above. This distribution is denoted
as Fˆ (Y |X) and obtained from integrating fˆ(y|x) over the domain of the random
variable Y . For a given value of α and x, the conditional quantile is obtained as
follows;
qˆα(x) = inf {y ∈ Y : Fˆ (Y |X) ≥ α} = Fˆ−1(α|x), (4.10)
with Fˆ−1(·|x) the inverse of the estimated cumulative distribution function Fˆ (·|X).
Nonparametric kernel estimation has been established as being relatively insen-
sitive to the choice of the kernel function. The same cannot be said for bandwidth
selection. A widely employed technique to determine the optimal vector of band-
width parameters is least squares cross-validation methods. The advantage of this
method over other alternatives, such as a rule of thumb or plug-in methods, is that
cross-validation automatically discards irrelevant information from the vector X (see
Hall et al. (2004) and Li and Racine (2007, p. 69)). The method automatically
determines which components of X are relevant and irrelevant, through assigning
large smoothing parameters to the latter and consequently shrinking them toward
the uniform distribution on the respective marginal distributions. Least squares
cross validation produces asymptotically optimal smoothing for relevant compo-
nents while eliminating irrelevant components by over-smoothing. This method is
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based on the principle of selecting a bandwidth that minimizes the integrated square
error of the resulting conditional density estimation, defined as
ISE =
∫
[fˆ(y|x)− f(y|x)]2µ(x)M(xc)dxdy (4.11)
where M(·) is a weight function giving different importance to different sections of
the conditional distribution.
4.4 Empirical Findings
The first block of the section studies the performance of the dynamic distributions
of the spreads and the corresponding cross-sectional volatilities. This analysis allows
observing the predictive ability of the underlying volatility in signalling instabilities
in funding rates. The second block explores the empirical relevance of the above
mentioned banks’ characteristics on the cross-sectional distribution of spreads.
4.4.1 Dynamics of Spreads: Mean and Volatility
This section exploits the nonparametric quantile methods discussed in Section 4.3 for
describing the dynamics of the funding rates and their volatilities. For expositional
purposes, a discrete set of relevant quantiles of the distribution of these quantities
are considered rather than their complete density functions. The study focuses on
the 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 90% percentiles. This can be easily done by exploiting
the flexibility of the nonparametric kernel density estimation method that allows to
obtain quantiles of the relevant underlying distributions. Figure 4.2 presents this
dynamic quantile analysis for the means and volatilities of the borrowing spreads;
Figure 4.3 reports the analysis corresponding to the lending spreads.
The mean and volatility patterns are similar across borrowing and lending costs.
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At the beginning of the evaluation period, interbank rates show very little disper-
sion indicating small differences in borrowing and lending conditions across banks
participating in the e-MID market. The graph reports an increase in the dispersion
of rates that becomes apparent from July 2007 until January 2008. This increase
in the dispersion of bank rates stresses the heterogeneous performance of the cross-
section of banks in both segments of the interbank market. During these months
the risk premium on banks searching for liquidity varies substantially indicating im-
portant differences in borrowing and lending conditions across banks trading on the
interbank market. The distribution of both borrowing and lending rates remains
symmetric during this period, this is not so during the second phase of the crisis.
In the borrowing segment, the median spread during this period is below zero indi-
cating that more than 50% of the banks in the e-MID market obtain funding rates
below the cross-sectional average. This implies the presence of a few problematic
banks viewed as risky and receiving large borrowing rates. These findings suggest
that whereas the crisis is widespread in the banking sector during the first phase
of the crisis and affects all banks in the system in a similar way, during the second
phase, it is more idiosyncratic and can be pinned down to the collapse of a few
distressed banking institutions. The dispersion in funding rates and asymmetric
cross-sectional distribution becomes more moderate during 2009 without managing
to recover the levels prior to the crisis. The lending market exhibits similar findings;
the asymmetric behavior of lending rates is less apparent than in the borrowing side
and indicates that the increase in asked rates is of similar magnitude across the
spectrum of banks in the supply side of the e-MID system.
The analysis of the quantile process of volatilities yields interesting findings.
Volatility spikes characterized in this framework by increases in the upper quantiles
of the distribution of volatilities are prior to the spikes observed in the distribution
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of spreads. This empirical finding provides support to the existence of what is
called in the analysis of equity market returns as leverage effect. Roughly speaking,
increases in the volatility of spreads are responded by increases in funding rates over
the next periods. Thus, during the period January to May 2007 banks in the upper
quantiles experience important differences in funding rates over the maintenance
period. This phenomenon signals high levels of uncertainty in the interbank market
over the health of these banks. At the start of the crisis, July 2007, uncertainty
is resolved and troubled banks receive high and stable borrowing rates over the
next periods. During the second phase of the crisis, spread and volatility increases
go hand in hand. Borrowing and lending rates widen over this period due to the
existence of a few troubled banks. In contrast to the first phase of the crisis, this
period is characterized by huge levels of uncertainty in the whole banking sector
that is reflected in highly variable daily spreads over the maintenance periods.
This study on the dynamics of the quantile process is complemented with a
more detailed analysis of the cross-sectional distribution of spreads obtained from
conditioning on several banks’ characteristics. The analysis is divided over six non-
overlapping subperiods covering the period 2006 to 2009. The density functions are
computed by pooling information on interest rates for each bank obtained over the
months comprised in each subperiod. This methodology is very useful for obtaining
aggregate measures of cross-sectional spreads over periods of economic relevance.
4.4.2 Size Matters
Asset size is an important variable to determine the characteristics of a commercial
bank. In fact, Angelini et al. (2011) note that before the crisis, banks’ asset size is
the only relevant variable that determines borrowing spreads faced by banks. These
authors also consider the rating or the capitalization ratio of banks as potential
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proxies for bank characteristics, however they find that these variables are not sta-
tistically significant. This empirical finding is supported for the US money market by
early studies such as Stigum (1990), Allen and Saunders (1986) and Furfine (2001)
that draw attention to the tiering structure in the federal funds market by which
large institutions get favorable rates compared to smaller institutions regardless the
side of the transaction they are on. A recent study by Gabrieli (2011a) confirms this
tiering structure of the European market during the different phases of the crisis.
By conditioning on the size of banks trading in the interbank market, nonpara-
metric estimates of the density of the cross-sectional spreads uncover significant
differences. The dataset only contains information on asset size for Italian banks.
There are 125 banks in the sample. The conditioning information set is defined by
a discrete categorical random variable taking five possible values where a value of 1
corresponds to the smallest group of banks and a value of 5 to the biggest banks.
Table 4.3 reports bandwidth parameters for the conditional density estimation of
spread on asset size classifications. Bandwidth parameters indicate that size is a
relevant variable on the determination of borrowing and lending spreads in all the
periods considered, even before the crisis. This is in line with previous studies such
as Angelini et al.(2011) and Gabrieli (2011a) that investigate the effects of asset size
on the determination of spread in a parametric setting.
Figure 4.4 reports the nonparametric densities for the borrowing spreads over the
different subperiods and Figure 4.5 the nonparametric estimates of the volatilities
as defined in (4.3). Figures 4.6 and 4.7 report the analogous densities for the lend-
ing rates. These charts allow to visualize the differences on the borrowing/lending
conditions of different sized banks. The figures describe an interbank money market
that abruptly moves from a stable market condition defined by similar funding rates
across banks regardless the size to a heterogeneous market characterized by very
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different borrowing/lending conditions at the start of the crisis. Figures 4.4 and 4.6
indicate that there are infinitesimal amount of differences on the spreads obtained
by different sized borrowers or lenders before the crisis. Hence, even though size is
a significant variable on the determination of spread according to both parametric
and nonparametric analysis, this study reveals that there are not remarkable differ-
ences on the funding costs of different sized banks. The differences are only visible
between the density of the largest (Italian) banks and the rest of banks after the
tensions in debt markets that emerged in September 2008. During this period the
differences in borrowing costs between banks of different sizes are substantial; the
existence of three modes in the density of the spreads on the largest banks signals
the clustering of banks in terms of their creditworthiness. Banks in the left tail of
the distribution enjoy significantly smaller borrowing rates than the rest of banks.
Nevertheless, there is another group of banks with rates not far from the average
borrowing rate over this period. The existence of three modes also indicates that
size is not the only relevant variable for explaining borrowing rates. A recent study
by Gabbi et al. (2012) suggests for example that some larger banks have better ex-
ploited changing microstructure features of the interbank market during the crisis.
After the crisis the differences between banks decrease but are still noticeable. The
charts in Figure 4.5 reveal an increase in volatility as the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers approaches. This phenomenon is not observed simultaneously for all banks. The
densities evolve from having one to two modes and the tails also become thicker
revealing the existence of two types of banks: some banks exhibiting similar funding
costs over this period and other banks exhibiting highly variable funding costs. This
variability becomes systemic after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Interestingly,
after the second phase of the crisis, the group of largest banks also exhibits the
largest variations in borrowing costs. This implies that for some days of the mainte-
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nance period these banks obtain very favorable rates compared to the average spread
on that day, and other days the funding rates are close to the average daily spread.
These measures of volatility give evidence of tension and uncertainty in interbank
markets over the crisis periods. After 2009, the volatility in the borrowing segment
considerably declines and returns to levels before 2007.
The analysis of the lending segment in Figure 4.6 exhibits less contrast. Lending
rates are similar across bank sizes. It is only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers
that the group of largest banks has the highest lending rates. The corresponding
densities are also bimodal giving support to the idea that not only size matters for
explaining lending rates. The high spreads obtained by large banks could be the
result of relationship lending, as suggested by Cocco et al. (2009), Affinito (2012),
and Brauning and Fecht (2011). The analysis of volatility in Figure 4.7 shows similar
patterns to those observed for the borrowing segment. The overall picture describes
a market in which size is a key variable for determining bank profitability. Largest
banks enjoy highest lending rates and lowest borrowing rates over the cross-section
of banks acting in the e-MID market.
4.4.3 The Role of Operating Currency and Bank’s
Nationality
The dataset of this study covers a non-crisis and a crisis period. The number of
active countries in the e-MID market over both periods is sixteen. Most of these
countries have adhered the Euro currency. These countries are Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
A few other participating countries such as Britain, Denmark, Norway, Poland and
Switzerland do not use the common currency, though. Commercial banks in the sec-
ond group of countries are not allowed to open a Euro account with ECB, and hence
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they cannot use ECB deposit facilities. Table 4.4 reports bandwidth parameters for
the conditional density estimation of spread on Euro/NonEuro classifications. Fig-
ures 4.8 and 4.9 describe the densities of interbank spreads conditional on the main
currency on which the bank operates. The graphs show no differences in funding
rates until the second phase of the crisis (Lehman Brothers collapse). After it, the
nonparametric densities indicate larger funding costs for banks in non-Euro coun-
tries than for banks in countries using the Euro as main currency. On the lending
side, the same results are obtained. Non-Euro banks request higher spreads for
lending funds to other banks than Euro banks. These higher lending rates are likely
to be due to the need of counteracting higher borrowing costs.
Although the sample does not contain information on size for foreign banks,
it is plausible to assume that foreign banks are of comparable size to the largest
Italian banks. This assumption is supported by the statistics on average transaction
size for foreign banks reported in Table 4.1 and by observational evidence that
notes that large European banks trade in international markets but smaller ones
are restricted to domestic markets. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 also present the comparison
between the densities of the largest Italian banks and foreign banks. These figures
reveal interesting insights on the extent of asymmetric information by borrowers and
lenders on large banks of different nationalities. During the ’Interbank Crisis’ period
and afterwards, funding conditions become tougher for foreign banks compared to
their domestic counterparties. This phenomenon marks a rupture in the integration
of the interbank market. From this period, a segmented market is observed that
favors domestic banks. These findings are in line with the theoretical framework
developed in Freixas and Holthausen (2005) on the role of asymmetric information
on interbank markets.
The study of banks’ nationality on the cross-sectional distribution of spreads has
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recently gained importance given the unprecedented increase in spreads observed in
some European sovereign debt markets. Although the sample ends in August 2009,
it is investigated whether there is early evidence of any discrepancy on funding con-
ditions between banks based in countries experiencing a sovereign crisis in posterior
periods and the rest of banks. Countries exposed to sovereign crisis are Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Table 4.4 reports bandwidth parameters for the condi-
tional density estimation of spread on Crisis/NonCrisis classifications. Figures 4.10
and 4.11 represent the densities of interbank spreads conditional on being in the
latter group of countries or not. The differences reflected in borrowing conditions
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers are very significant. Banks in countries un-
der sovereign distress experience borrowing rates well above those of banks based
in undistressed economies. The lending side, on the other hand, does not reflect
significant differences in funding rates between banks from distressed economies and
the rest of European banks. These findings show evidence of borrowing difficulties
for banks in these countries well before the respective countries had trouble in fund-
ing themselves, and highlight the importance of the interbank market as an early
warning indicator of sovereign debt distress when using appropriate conditioning
information.
It should be noted that this is an aggregate result obtained from pooling in-
formation from banks in the four countries above mentioned. In order to extract
meaningful information on which countries are mainly driving these results a more
detailed analysis conditioning on specific countries and not on economic regions
should be performed. With this purpose, Greece funding conditions are compared
with those of banks in Britain and Germany. The results in Figures 4.12 and 4.13
illustrate the remarkable differences in borrowing conditions between banks based
in Germany and Greece. These graphs also reveal a more pronounced effect of the
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Lehman Brothers collapse on the borrowing rates of British banks than of Ger-
man banks indicating the higher exposure of the British banking sector to the US
economy. On the lending side, substantial differences are not observed on spreads
conditional on banks’ nationality. It is interesting to observe that in the last period
Greek banks exhibit a bimodal distribution indicating the existence of a small group
of, possibly troubled, banks offering lending rates well below market rates.
4.5 Conclusion
Interbank markets are the main instrument for the transmission of monetary policy
targets from central banks to the overall economy. This market is responsible for
supplying liquidity to the financial system through the buying and selling operations
of participant commercial banks. The cross-section of interbank rates provides useful
information on the performance of the banking sector.
This chapter explores the cross-sectional distribution of aggregate monthly rates
obtained as the average of daily spreads in the e-MID market. In both borrowing
and lending segments, it is observed that there are leverage and feedback effects
between cross-sectional volatility in daily funding costs and their magnitude. More
specifically, leverage implies that volatility in daily spreads is responded by increases
in funding rates and suggests that volatility is a useful indicator of distress in money
markets. Similarly, a feedback effect is observed implying that large funding rates
feed into increases in the dispersion of rates. Both phenomena are more remarkable
for the borrowing segment of the money market. The dynamic analysis of the spreads
also shows that the 2007 and 2008 crises have different implications. The first crisis
has widespread effects on the entire banking sector, reflected in higher borrowing
spreads across the sector. The second crisis caused by the collapse of some major
financial institutions produces uncertainty in daily interest rates in both borrowing
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and lending segments. In this case the quantile process of spreads shows an interbank
market given by a small sample of troubled banks exhibiting high spreads than the
rest of banks that obtain borrowing spreads below the cross-sectional average.
The analysis of the factors with statistical significance to describe the perfor-
mance of funding rates reveals that size, bank’s nationality and the operating cur-
rency are influential variables that can help to predict the relative success of a bank
during turmoil periods in the money market. Thus, size is a key variable for de-
termining bank profitability; largest banks enjoy the highest lending rates and the
lowest borrowing rates over the cross-section of banks acting in the e-MID market.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers accentuates the differences in funding conditions
between largest banks and the rest. Also, banks in the Euro currency area obtain
lower funding rates than banks based in non-Euro countries. This can be due to the
existence of the European Central Bank acting as a potential liquidity provider in
the Euro system or to the perception that Euro countries are less risky than their
non-Euro counterparts. Interestingly, non-Euro countries also have higher lending
rates. The analysis of the relationship between interbank rates and sovereign crisis
reveals important differences in borrowing costs between banks in Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain compared to the rest of banks. These results suggest that dis-
tress in the banking sector of these countries is prior to the occurrence of their
respective sovereign crises, and the interbank market provided early warning signals
of the incoming sovereign crisis. As a further research, we will exploit multivariate
kernel methods to generalize kernel density estimation to the multivariate case. This
will allow us to investigate the impact of multiple predictors such as Euro/NonEuro,
Crisis/NonCrisis and asset size classifications on the density estimation of borrowing
and lending spreads.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes the findings and main conclusions of each empirical chapter
and offers suggestions for future research. The main subject of the thesis is to
provide further insight into the effect of 2007-2008 crisis on the CDS and interbank
market. This is because 2007-2008 crisis poses a considerable threat to the financial
stability and leads to disruptions in both Credit Default Swap and interbank market
transactions.
Chapter 1 provides background information about the topics of the thesis. This
chapter especially draws attention to the 2007-2008 crisis and evolution of CDS
and interbank market during the crisis. The structure of this chapter is as follows.
Section 5.2 discusses the conclusions of each empirical chapter as well as the impli-
cations of the findings, while Section 5.3 discusses the limitations of this thesis and
proposes suggestions for future research.
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5.2 Conclusions and Implications of the Findings
This thesis reveals that 2007-2008 crisis has series repercussions on CDS and inter-
bank market. In both markets, deterioration in the financial conditions triggers the
changes in the the pricing of credit risk.
Chapter 2 investigates the determinants of CDS spread in the short run and
considers counterparty risk as one of the determinants of the spread different from
the existing literature. Empirical findings indicate that CDS spreads display pro-
nounced regime specific behavior in a way that financial and non-financial contracts
demonstrate different sensitivity to systematic and idiosyncratic variables during
tranquil and volatile periods. The credit risk of the seller, counterparty risk, is re-
flected in the CDS prices of non-financial contracts after the outset of the recent
crisis. However the effect of counterparty risk is not observed in the financial con-
tracts. This counterintuitive result reminds ’Too-Big-to-Fail’ argument. When the
overall financial industry is in distress, the government is expected to bail out the
dealers to prevent systemic risk as experienced with the bail out of AIG and GE
Capital.
This chapter has two main implications for regulators and CDS traders. First,
different CDS pricing and risk management tools should be developed for financial
and non-financial contracts. Second, strict collateral requirements should be intro-
duced in the market or Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (CCPs) should be
widespread covering all types of CDS contracts worldwide to mitigate counterparty
risk.
Chapter 3 examines the long-run determinants of European CDS spreads con-
sidering iTraxx Europe index and stock price of the firm that allows investigat-
ing information flow between credit and equity markets. This chapter proposes a
long-run equilibrium model incorporating an endogenous structural break to the
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determinants arising from deterioration in the financial conditions during the crisis.
Chapter 3 reveals that causality runs from the iTraxx index and the stock market
to the CDS market. Hence, stock market leads price discovery process. CDS market
informational dominance or bidirectional causality between stock and CDS market
mentioned in previous studies can be misleading and arises from neglecting the break
in the series. VECM representation of cointegration model indicates that changes in
CDS spreads are mainly explained by changes in iTraxx index, but not stock return.
This high explanatory power of iTraxx index on CDS spread change is in line with
capital asset pricing models for equity market.
Chapter 4 studies European interbank market to detect early warning indicators
of financial distress in overall financial system. This is done by analyzing the cross-
sectional density of interbank funding rates using nonparametric kernel methods
and by investigating the effect of banks’ size, operating currency, banks’ nationality
and time periods on the cross-sectional distribution of these rates in the European
e-MID market.
In both demand and supply sides of the market, there are leverage and feedback
effects between cross-sectional volatility in daily funding costs and their magnitude.
Especially in the borrowing segment, volatility is a very useful indicator of distress
in money markets. Subprime crisis in 2007 and the collapse of main institutions in
2008 has different implications on the interbank market. The first crisis has affected
entire banking sector leading increases in all funding rates. However the second
crisis has more idiosyncratic nature and characterized by higher uncertainty. Con-
ditional density analysis of borrowing spreads on bank size, nationality and currency
indicates that the market moves from homogeneous state to heterogeneous one with
the start of the crisis. Especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, banks that
have larger asset size and adopt Euro currency improve their advantageous position
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in the market further. Banks based in countries that experienced sovereign crisis
have to pay more than other banks well before the actual dates of the crisis.
These analytical techniques reveal the ability of interbank markets to signal early
warning of distress in the overall financial sector. They have also implications for
policy makers and regulators to develop appropriate structures for different types of
banks in order to prevent a shock to the system during liquidity shortages in money
markets.
5.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for
Future Research
The aim of this section is to express limitations of this thesis in terms of availability
of data and econometric approaches and suggests some future directions to enhance
the understanding of changes in the CDS and interbank market during financial
crisis.
Chapter 2 offers some of the first insights into the pricing dynamics of counter-
party risk in the CDS market. However having access to contracts sold by only one
dealer (HSBC Bank PLC) poses a limitation to the generalization of the findings.
Ideally, this analysis should include CDS contracts sold by other dealers. If there
will be an opportunity to have an access to the dataset of many dealers, it would
be of great interest to replicate the analysis to the large dataset.
In Chapter 3, the proposed model allows to test the long-run relation between
variables by allowing a break in explanatory variables, thus accommodating potential
changes in relation between explanatory and dependant variables. Further research
can be conducted to bonds to check the long run relation between bonds and bond
indices and stock prices. This allows revealing the changes in relationship arising
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from the recent crisis and also exploring the price discovery between bond and
stock market. An interesting extension of this chapter could be to consider option
implied volatility as an idiosyncratic variable and market implied volatility as a
systematic variable.This hardly explored issue in the current literature can enhance
our understanding about price discovery process between CDS and option market.
The methodology suggested in this thesis could be a nice option to explore this issue.
In Chapter 4, distribution of spreads and volatility of spreads serves for early
warning signals for interbank distress. Generalizing kernel density estimation to
the multivariate case is an interesting topic for further research. We will exploit
kernel density estimation of borrowing and lending spreads with multiple predictors
such as Euro/NonEuro, Crisis/NonCrisis and asset size classifications. Furthermore,
a possible extension could be to investigate geographic difference in more detail.
For instance, analyzing countries separately and focusing on the relation between
volatility and spread distribution enhance our understanding of the effect of crisis
on the interbank market.
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